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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Anti-trust Laws-Robinson-Patman Act-Price Discrimination-
Proportionally Equal Terms
In 1936, Congress enacted the Robinson-Patman Act' in an endeavor
to plug the holes in the anti-trust dike concerning price discrimination. 2
Some observers seemed confident at the time the Act was passed that
its "intent" was clear.3 H6wever, subsequent events have revealed
many ambiguities. One writer has been prompted to remark that
"There is a law suit in literally every word of it." '4
The phrase "proportionally equal terms," in subsections (d) and
(e), 5 has been characterized as a "legislative monstrosity" because of
its ambiguities. The source of the trouble is that these sections purport
to prescribe a standard for determining what constitutes equality in the
granting of services or facilities but no actual standard is given. The
payments or services must be made to different purchasers on "propor-
tionally equal terms." The Federal Trade Commission has been given
wide latitude to determine what constitutes "proportionally equal terms."
This "blank check" has left the Act without a definite standard and has
149 STAT. 1526 (1938), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (Supp. 1952).
'An excellent discussion of the legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act
may be found in: Evans, Anti-Price Discrimination Act of 1936, 23 VA. L. Ray.
140 (1936) ; NoEs, 36 COL. L. Rxv. 1285 (1936) ; 50 HARV. L. Rav. 106 (1936).
'Mr. Commissioner Ayres, Chairman of the Commission in 1937, said of the
new legislation: "I do not contend that the Act is without imperfections, but I do
believe that any business man who desires and conscientiously endeavors to keep
within its provisions will have little trouble in doing so. Its purpose and intent are
clear." NoRwooD, TRADE PRACTICE AND PRoCEDuRE LAW (1938).
'GORDON, CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS ON THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ANTI-DIs-
CRIMINATION ACT, p. 21 (1936). Some Senators were confused as to its purport.
80 CONG. REc. 6429 (1936). But see note 11, infra.
549 STAT. 1526 (1938), 15 U. S. C. §13 (Supp. 1952):
Subsection (d) : "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to
pay or contract for the payment of anything of value to or for the benefit of a
customer of such person in the course of such commerce as compensation or in
consideration for any services or facilities furnished by or through such customer
in connection with the processing, handling, sale or offering for sale by such person,
unless such payment or consideration is available on proportionally equal terms to
all other customers competing in the distribution of such products or commodities."
Subsection (e) : "It shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate in favor of
one purchaser against another purchaser or purchasers of a commodity bought for
resale, with or without processing, by contracting to furnish or furnishing, or by
contributing to the furnishing of, any services or facilities connected with the
processing, handling, sale or offering for sale of such commodity so purchased upon
terms not accorded to all purchasers on proportionally equal terms." [Italics added.].
Oppenheim, Should the Robinson-Patman Act Be Amendedf CCH ROBINsO)N-
PATMAN AcT SYmPosium 141, 146 (1948). At the Conference Proceedings on
the Robinson-Patman Act held in New York on July 8, 1936, Mr. Gordon stated:
"The only definite thing about the phrase ... is that it is indefinite."
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led to attacks in the courts. But so far these provisions have withstood
assault.7 The purpose of this note is to inquire into the possible ratios
which may come within the purview of "proportionally equal terms."
In the case of Elizabeth Arden Sales Corporation v. Gus Blass,8 the
appellant advanced, in theory, the ratio of "dollar volume of purchases
made." Had the figures of the appellant been correct 0 and the allow-
ances offered to each of the companies graduated to shift throughout
I Subsection (e) was attacked on the ground of being unconstitutional in Eliza-
beth Arden, Inc., v. Federal Trade Commission, 156 F. 2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946),
cert. denied, 331 U. S. 806. The Court of Appeals, in ruling against the petitioner,
stated: "We reject the contention that the standard in section (e) is so indefinite
that men of common intelligence cannot adequately grasp its meaning and therefore
it is invalid as an improper delegation of legislative power and violative of due
process.!
8 150 F. 2d 988 (8th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U. S. 773. Here appellant, a
Delaware corporation, was the distributing and sales company of Eliabzeth Arden,
Inc., a manufacturer of cosmetics. Appellee owned and operated a department store
in Little Rock, Ark., said store containing a cosmetic and toilet-goods department. In
1938 appellee, via an oral contract with appellant, began to carry the Elizabeth
Arden line of products. It was agreed that appellant would pay one half of the
salary of a "demonstrator" in appellee's store amounting to $10 per week, said
"demonstrator" to push the sales of Elizabeth Arden products when it was possible
to do so. At other times this "demonstrator" was to wait on the general trade.
This arrangement remained in effect for two years at which time the appellant
discontinued selling Elizabeth Arden cosmetics to the appellee and in lieu of the
appellee, the appellant began selling to the M. M. Cohn Co., another department
store in Little Rock, Ark., and a competitor of appellee. The Cohn Co. had been
handling Elizabeth Arden cosmetics during the period that the appellee handled
them and the appellee knew of this. However, the appellant failed to disclose to
the appellee that he (appellant) had been paying all of the salary of the "demon-
strator" for the M. M. Cohn Co., a total of $20 per week. Appellee seeks to recover
three fold the difference between the amount of the allowances made and the value
of the services furnished to Cohn and those to the appellee. The trial court had
held in favor of the appellee for $10 per week for 101 weeks or an aggregate of
$1,010.00.
1 Appellant seeks to substantiate his case by stating, in the language of the court
that ". . . taking the total amount of products purchased by Cohn Co. over the
entire period involved, in the sum of $18,593.40, and the total amount purchased
by the appellee, in the sum of $11,250.35, then deducting the amount of goods, in
the sum of $2,463.04, which Cohn Co. took off appellee's hands . . .and finally
comparing the net figure of $8,787.51 for appellee with the figure of $18,593.40 for
Cohn Co.," there is a ratio of proportionality set up as the dollar volume purchased
by each of the two companies. Converting his dollar volume purchased into per-
centages, appellant contends that since Cohn Co. did more than 67% of the business
and appellee received much more than a proportionate share of the salary, i.e. 50%
instead of 33%', appellant is in the clear and the appellee is in no position to contend
that he has been slighted or a violation of the law has occurred.
10 However, the court found a number of fallacies in the appellant's argument,
including some discrepancies in appellant's figures. They stated: ". . . In the next
place appellant's retrospective effort to adopt appellee's entire purchasing period as
the base for testing the question of proportional treatment in relation to the amount
of goods bought is purely artificial, for the evidence does not show that its policy
of furnishing clerk's services or paying clerk's salaries ever was related to such a
base. In passing, it may also be noted that, if appellant had undertaken to make
a comparison of purchases by a calender year, appellee's purchases for the period
that it handled appellant's products in 1938 would have shown $5,117.78 as against
$3,834,83 for Cohn Co., and if a fiscal year had been taken commencing with the
date that appellee began handling appellant's products it would have shown pur-
chases of $7,086.86 by appellee during that specific period ls against $7,575.82 by
Cohn Co."
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the business relationship so as to mirror their true value, the Commis-
sion probably would have upheld appellant's contention." However,
in reality, the appellant's facts indicate that the ratio which he in fact
advanced was one of his own discretion and favor. This was rejected
as being merely an arbitrary arrangement. The court stated: "That
which was discriminatory under the statute when done, cannot subse-
quently, in order to enable the seller to escape damages the discrimina-
tion, be artificially tailored into proportionally equal terms by fitting it
to some imaginary basis or standard that has never in fact existed."' 2
Even though the court does not go into all the ramifications of "pro-
portionally equal terms," it does infer that the proportionality must have
a sound basis of existence, not a mere arbitrary arrangement, and such
basis must have its birth not later than co-existent with the furnishing
of the service or facility.
"The Court approved the Commission's cease and desist order which stated:
"The statute affords the seller a free election in the first instance as to what services
or facilities, if any, he will provide to purchasers of his products; but having elected
to furnish a particular service or facility to a particular purchaser or puchasers, he
thereby assumes the obligation of according similar services to all competing pur-
chasers to the extent required by the statute. The furnishing of a service or fa-
cility which cannot be proportionalized for the benefit of competing purchasers, or,
in the alternative, the failure or-refusal to proportionalize the terms upon which
services or facilities are granted, so as to make it reasonably possible for com-
peting purchasers to avail themselves of such services or facilities if they desire to
do so, constitutes a failure to accord such services or facilities upon proportionally
equal terms."
Both the Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives, explaining
the meaning of "proportionally equal terms," concurred: "Where a competitor can
furnish them (i.e., services or facilities) in less quantity but of the same relative
value, he seems entitled, and this clause is designed to accord him, the right to a
similar allowance commensurate with those facilities. To illustrate: Where, as
was revealed in the hearings . . . . a manufacturer grants to a particular chain
distributor as advertising allowance of a stated amount per month per store in
which the former's goods are sold, a competing customer with a smaller number
of stores, but equally able io furnish the same service per store, and under condi-
tions of the same value to the seller, would be entitled to a similar allowance on
that basis." SEN. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) ; H. R. REP. No. 2287,
74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
Furthermore, Senator Logan, who was in charge of the bill on the floor of the
Senate, stated: "But if the seller grants an advertising allowance to one customer
there is no reason why he should not grant, under identical circumstances, the
same allowance to another customer based upon the quantity of the purchases. If
one man buys $100,000 in goods and should be allowed $1,000 for advertising pur-
poses, and another buys $10,000 in goods, he ought to be allowed $100 for adver-
tising. That is not prohibited by the bill. So long as the same advertising allow-
ances are made proportionately on the amount of purchases there is no prohibition
in the bill against them." 80th CoxG. Rwc. 3231 (1936). Congressman Utterback,
who was in charge of the bill on the floor of the House stated: "But proportional
to what? Proportional naturally to those customers' purchases and to their ability
and equipment to render or furnish the service or facilities to be paid for." 80th
CONG. REc. 9558 (1936). This would seem to be an indorsement of both the instant
ratio," Dollar Volu-me Purchased" and also "Quantity Purchased Ratio," which
will be discussed later.1 150 F. 2d 988, 994 (8th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U. S. 773 (1945).
[Vol. 32
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However, the "dollar volume purchased ratio"' 3 is not, as a matter
of law, the only basis upon which allowances or facilities may be
tendered.
Another possible ratio may be found in quantities purchased. A re-
cent survey by the American Law Institute stated: ". . . merchandising
payments and services may be considered granted on proportionally
equal terms when the payments are made or the services furnished in
proportion to the respective quantities of goods purchased by different
purchasers."' 4 Thus, if A sold B 100 car loads of potatoes and gave B
$100 to use for advertising for the sale of the potatoes, C, a competitor
of B, who bought 50 car loads of potatoes, would be entitled to $50 for
use in advertising the potatoes.15
Still another method of equalizing payments or services in a logically
valid ratio is by making such payments or services in proportion to
specified services furnished by the buyers without relation to the volume
of goods purchased, either dollar volume or volume purchased.' 6 For
13 Laton, "Demonstrators on Proportionally Equal Terms," CCH Robinson-
Patman Act Symposium, 38, 44 (1948).
Elizabeth Arden Sales Corporation v. Gus Blass, 150 F. 2d 988 (8th Cir. 1945),
cert. denied, 326 U. S. 773; accord, Elizabeth Arden, Inc., v. Federal Trade Com-
mission, 156 F. 2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U. S. 806. In the last case
cited, petitioner sought to have the court review an order by the Federal Trade
Commission holding a violation of 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimi-
nation Act. The facts were that petitioner sold a "prestige" line of cosmetics in
the several states to stores judged by petitioner to have facilities and appropriate
services to merchandise the cosmetics in such a way which would appeal to cus-
tomers having exclusiveness and fashion as buying motives. To their more im-
portant stores, which constituted less than 10% of the total number of stores, peti-
tioners furnished "demonstrator" service, paying all or part of the salary to such
"demonstrators." To the remaining 90% of their customers, who bought some
60% of petitioner's total sales, no "demonstrator" service was given. The terms
vhich kept the 90% from being accorded this service were their inability to "'co-
operate! satisfactorily with petitioners by reciprocally furnishing to them . ..
services and facilities to promote the resale of Arden cosmetics, such as carrying
a representative stock, making available counter-displays, advertising once or twice
a month ... etc." The evidence tended to show that where the "demonstrators'
were furnished, the sales of the Arden line of cosmetics increased, "sometimes as
much as tripled." Upon this evidence, the Commission found that petitioners had
violated the Act, since the subsection "required a seller who elected to furnish any
service or facility to any purchaser to proportion both service or facility and terms
so as not to exclude any competitive purchaser." In upholding the Commission, the
court refused to read the limitation of an injurious effect upon competition of sub-
section (a) into subsection (e). Thus, subsection (e) is construed to be a per se
violation, as is subsection (d), the only defense being a flat denial of the charge.
In the instant case, petitioner tried unsuccessfully to use subjective considerations
such as prestige value of the displays, etc. as a basis for proportioning the "demon-
strators." The court rejected this as being much too arbitrary.
" AUSTIN, PRicE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBIN-
SON-PATM1AN Acv, 132 (1950).
"3 Although there have been no court decisions holding the "Quantity Purchased
Ratio" to be a valid standard, this would seem to follow from Congressman Utter-
back's statement, note 11, supra. It is contended that not only should $50 be avail-
able for C's use in advertising A's potatoes but also an alternative, that is a $50
equivalent in value. See notes 20 and 23, infra.
" Feldman & Zorn, "Advertising and Promotional Allowances," Bureau of
National Affairs (1948).
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example, A agrees to pay B at the rate of $10 per week per square foot
of window space for a maximum of 10 square feet for the exclusive
display of A's product for a period not to exceed four weeks. Therefore,
B receives $100 per week or $400 for the four week period. Now, sup-
pose C, a competitor of B, has only five square feet of window space. If C
agrees to display A's goods for two weeks, under this ratio C will be
entitled to $50 per week or $100 for the two weeks. But, even so, C is
still receiving the payments from A at the same rate of $10 per square
foot for four weeks, i.e., the same rate as that of B.
A similar situation would arise under the instant ratio if S, Seller,
agreed to pay B, Buyer, for specified local advertising of S's product a
sum not to exceed $100 per week which is to be 50% of the Buyer's cost
of such advertising for a maximum of four weeks. If X, a competitor
of B and a purchaser from S, had the same agreement with S and wished
to advertise for only two weeks and to buy local advertising at a total
cost of $100 per week, S under this agreement would pay $50 for each
of the two weeks. Thus, S is paying the 50% of the local advertising of
each buyer, both B and X, in proportion to the reciprocal advertising
service expense incurred by the buyers.
Conceding the above ratios to be proportional, there is still a strict
requirement which must be complied with. The reciprocal services or
facilities required of the purchasers for participation in the plan must
be within the ability of the smallest competing purchasers to furnish.
As the Commission stated in its findings in the Elizabeth Arden case:17
"The furnishing of a service or facility which cannot be proportionalized
for the benefit of competing purchasers or, in the alternative, the failure
or refusal to proportionalize the terms upon which services or facilities
are granted, so as to make it reasonably possible for competing pur-
chasers to avail themselves of such services or facilities if they desire to
do so, constitutes a failure to accord such services or facilities upon
proportionally equal terms. The phrase 'upon terms not accorded to
all purchasers on proportionally equal terms' contemplates the propor-
tionalization of the terms, and this necessarily includes the proportionali-
zation of the service or facility as well."
It is nowhere stated in subsection (d)' s that the payments made to
competing customers for services in return must be for services of the
same type. Nor does subsection (e) 19 provide that services furnished
to all purchasers must be of the same type. Thus, it has been stated:
"The way is left open to offer alternative terms to smaller purchasers
to suit their abilities, or alternative services to suit their needs." 20 This
1739 F. T. C. 288, 302 (1944).
"8 See note 5, supra. 10 See note 5, spra.
20 "For example, a manufacturer who has arranged with certain large purchasers
to pay all or a part of the cost of their newspaper and radio advertising, might
meet the 'proportionally equal terms,' requirement by offering payments to smaller
purchasers for providing window displays, distributing handbills, etc. If the co-
[Vol. 32
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would seem to be only conjecture, however, since the courts have not
read into the provision such a liberal interpretation. Even so, it would
seem logical as well as practical since, if a company agreed to paint
delivery trucks with the name of their product inscribed thereon for
use by a distributor, without such a liberal interpretation, the company
would be supposed to furnish identical services to other distributors who
made no use of trucks whatsoever.
However, the Federal Trade Commission, dividing 3-2, has attempted
to alleviate the situation in the Cosmetic Industry.2 In 1951 the Com-
mission issued certain rules for the Cosmetic Industry. One in particu-
lar was aimed at solving the problem of offering demonstrator services
by the manufacturers of cosmetics to all retail members of the industry
on terms of equality.22  The majority of the Commission realized that
too liberal an interpretation of the proportioning of demonstrator services
would lead to obvious absurdities. 23 The dissent contended that the
statute furnished no basis for any provision concerning alternative types
of promotional services. It seems clear that expediency and practical
necessity have emerged the victor over mere form and, therefore, the
rule as now promulgated is that where the demonstrator service is not
suitable to the facilities of one particular customer-24purchaser,25 an
operative merchandising services which the seller requires of large customers are
of a type which small customers cannot furnish, the terms offered should provide
for proportional benefits to the latter conditioned on the furnishing of alternative
services within their ability to render." AUSTIN, PaiCE DIScRIMSINArON AND RE-
LATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATmAN Acr 136 (1950).
21 F. T. C. Trade Practice Rules for the Cosmetic and Toilet Preparation Indus-
try, 16 Fed. Reg. 11,993 (1951), 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (9th ed.) 120,282 (1951).
. These rules, called "Group I" rules, set out those things which the Federal
Trade Commission consider to be illegal within the industry as distinguished from
"Group II" rules which merely set out those practices that are undesirable Within
the industry. Thus. "'Group r Trade Practice Rules merely express the under-
standing of the F. T. C. as to what conduct is illegal under the statutes within itsjurisdiction, in an endeavor to secure voluntary compliance and avoid individual
cease-and-desist proceedings." 65 HARv. L. Rv. 1261, 1262 (1952).
It is to be noted that these Trade Practice Rules must be viewed principally as
the weather forecast of "administrative wind" that the F. T. C. intends to follow
and not a reliable statement of existing law. That this latter statement is true is
evident from the fact that these rules do not grant immunity from prosecution but
they do help the industry form policies.
22 "As an example of eventual absurdity, if a girl demonstrator were employed
in a department store, it might be contended that the law .would be violated unless
proportionate services of the same girl would be provided for every small drug store
within range of that competition. And then, to continue on this road toward ab-
surdity, we might have to find some means of measuring the energy and enthusiasm
of the girl when she worked for a department store, as compared with when she
worked for a drug store. . . .Absurdities could be piled upon absurdities, if it
were necessary to prove that any such interpretation of the law was not intended
by the Congress." ANNUAL SuRVEy OF AmERIcAN LAW, 291 (1952).
"4 See note 7, supra. "It shall be unlawful... unless such payment or considera-
tion is available on proportionally equal terms to all other customers .. ." § 13(d).
(Italics added.)
2" See note 7, supra. "It shall be unlawful . .. or offering for sale of such
commodity so purchased upon terms not accorded to all purchasers on proportion-
ally equal terms." § 13 (e). (Italics added.)
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"alternative type of promotional service or facility which is of equivalent
measurable cost ' 26 may be substituted in its place.
It could be argued with some merit that the same type of policy rules
should apply to other industries inasmuch as their problems, in part,
are not unlike those in the Cosmetic Industry.
Although the Commission and the courts have indirectly approved
only one interpretation of the phrase "proportionally equal terms," this
is by no means the only ratio that would be valid under the Act. The
real hope of the phrase lies not in its ambiguous past nor its equally
uncertain present but in future liberal constructions which the judicial
and administrative bodies must, of necessity, place upon it.
EDWIN S. PRESTON, JR.
Criminal Law-Former jeopardy-Discharge of jury Held to
Bar Subsequent Prosecution
Defendant was on trial for murder. At the end of the third day of
the trial the jurors were taken to a local hotel for the night. During the
night, the police, upon being called to investigate the conduct of the
jurors, found three in an intoxicated condition. When court was con-
vened the next day, in the absence of the jury and upon the testimony
of the officers, the judge withdrew a juror and declared a mistrial. The
defendant objected to the order of mistrial, and upon the court's over-
ruling the objection, duly excepted. At a later trial the defendant was
convicted of manslaughter, the court overruling a plea of former jeop-
ardy, to which the defendant duly excepted. On appeal, the Supreme
Court in a unanimous decision vacated the judgment, held the order of
mistrial improper and sustained the defendant's plea of former jeopardy1
The principle that a person shall not be twice put in jeopardy for
the same offense is deeply rooted in American jurisprudence. 2 It is well
established that jeopardy attaches when a competent jury is sworn
"8 See note 23, supra.
State v. Crocker, 239 N. C. 446, 80 S. E. 2d 243 (1954). The city police
officers testified that they observed three jurors moving along the halls of the hotel
in an intoxicated condition. The sheriff testified that he observed one of the jurors
in an intoxicated condition either from alcoholic beverages or narcotic drugs, and
had to threaten arrest before the juror would become quiet and re-enter his room.2 The Federal Constitution and all of the state constitutions, except the Consti-
tutions of Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Vermont,
contain prohibitions against double jeopardy. The states that do not have a con-
stitutional provision have the principle as a part of their common law. State v.
Benham, 7 Conn. 414 (1829) ; Gilpin v. State, 142 Md. 464, 121 Atl. 354 (1923) ;
Commonwealth v. McCan, 277 Mass. 199, 178 N. E. 633 (1931) ; State v. Clem-
mons, 207 N. C. 276, 176 S. E. 760 (1934) ; State v. O'Brien, 106 Vt. 97, 170 Atl.
98 (1934). See A. I. L., Administration of the Criminal Law, Commentary to § 6
(Proposed final draft for 1935) for a complete listing of the Constitutional pro-
visions.
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and impaneled to try the case.3  If the discharge of the jury and the
declaration of a mistrial is at the instance or with the consent of the
defendant, this constitutes a waiver, and he cannot later maintain a plea
of former jeopardy.4
Early decisions gave the courts little authority to discharge the jury
and declare a mistrial for any cause, without prejudicing the state's right
to proceed again.5  However, the strict rule of those decisions has been
greatly relaxed and the present-day rule is that a trial judge may dis-
charge a jury and declare a mistrial without working an acquittal of
the defendant when there is a manifest necessity or when justice would
be better served under the circumstances. 6 North Carolina classifies
the types of necessity warranting the discharge of the jury into two
kinds: "physical necessity" and the "necessity of doing justice." Ne-
cessity for a mistrial arising from misconduct of one or more of the jurors
might well fall into either class.8
The impossibility of defining all of the circumstances under which
Westover v. State, 66 Ariz. 145, 185 P. 2d 315 (1947) ; State ex rel. Larkins
v. Lewis, 54 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 1951) ; State v. Hutter, 145 Neb. 798, 18 N. W. 2d 203
(1945) ; State v. Bell, 205 N. C. 225, 171 S. E. 50 (1933) ; 22 C. J. S., Criminal
Law § 241 n. 64 (1940).
'Barrett v. Bigger, 57 App. D. C. 81, 17 F. 2d 669 (1927), cert. denied, 274
U. S. 752 (1927) ; Westover v. State, 66 Ariz. 145, 185 P. 2d 315 (1947) ; People
v. Agnew, 77 Cal. App. 2d 748, 176 P. 2d 724 (1947), cert. denied, 337 U. S. 909
(1949), rehearing denied, 337 U. S. 927 (1949), rehearing again denied, 338 U. S.
842 (1949) ; Kamen v. Gray, 169 Kan. 664, 220 P. 2d 160 (1950), cert. denied, 340
U. S. 890 (1950) ; State v. Dry, 152 N. C. 813, 67 S. E. 1000 (1910) ; Etter v.
State, 185 Tenn. 218, 205 S. W. 2d 1 (1947) ; Chamberlain v. State, 146 Tex. Cr.
R. 300, 174 S. W. 2d 604 (1943).
Atkins v. State, 16 Ark. 568 (1855) (urgent necessity) ; McCorkle v. State,
14 Ind. 39 (1859) (imperious necessity) ; State v. Bass, 82 N. C. 570 (1880)
(great necessity) ; State v. Ephraim, 19 N. C. 162 (1836) (evident, urgent, over-
ruling necessity arising from matters beyond humnan foresight and control). The
Supreme Court of the United States had earlier indicated a relaxation of the rule,
in holding that a mistrial could be proper where the ends of justice would other-
%vise be defeated. United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579 (U. S. 1824).
' "We think, that in cases of this nature, the law has invested courts of justice
to discharge the jury from giving any verdict, whenever in their opinion, taking
all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act,
or the ends of justice would otherwise be defeated." United States v. Perez, 9
Wheat. 579, 580 (U. S. 1824) ; accord, Maddox v. State, 230 Ind. 92, 102 N. E. 2d
225 (1951); Baker v. Commonwealth, 280 Ky. 165, 132 S. W. 2d 766 (1939);
Ex parte Earle, 316 Mich. 295, 25 N. W. 2d 202 (1946) ; State v. Bowman, 231
N. C. 51, 55 S. E. 2d 789 (1949) ; State v. Beal, 199 N. C. 278, 154 S. E. 604
(1930) ; State v. Cain, 175 N. C. 825, 95 S. E. 930 (1918) ; State v. Upton, 170
N. C. 769, 87 S. E. 328 (1915) ; State v. Tyson, 138 N. C. 627, 628, 50 S. E. 456
(1905) ("It is well settled and admits of no controversy that in all cases, capital
included, the court may discharge a jury and order a mistrial when it is necessary
to attain the ends of justice.") ; Yarborough v. State, 90 Okla. Cr. R 74, 210 P. 2d
375 (1949) ; State v. Brunn, 22 Wash. 2d 120, 154 P. 2d 826 (1945).
' State v. Beal, 199 N. C. 278, 154 S. E. 604 (1930) ; State v. Tyson, 138 N. C.
627, 50 S. E. 456 (1905) ; State v. Bell, 81 N. C. 591 (1879); State v. Wiseman,
68 N. C. 203 (1873).
8 See State v. Tyson, 138 N. C. 627, 50 S. E. 456 (1905) (juror, because in-
toxicated, was physically unfit to continue: too, the ends of justice would be de-
feated if he were allowed to serve).
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a discharge of the jury and an order of mistrial would be proper requires
that this power rest in the sound discretion of the trial judge.0 It is
generally held that the discharge of the jury will not be reviewed unless
there is a clear abuse of this discretion. 10  A few jurisdictions," in-
cluding North Carolina, 12 require the trial judge to find the facts upon
which the order was based and set them out in the record in order that
they may be reviewed by the appellate court upon the application of the
defendant. In North Carolina, however, the finding of fact is required,
and review of an order of mistrial allowed, only in capital felonies.18
Hence a plea of former jeopardy is not available in misdemeanors and
non-capital felonies in the absence of a showing of "gross" abuse 14 of
discretion, since it is a non-reviewable matter resting in the discretion,
of the trial court.15
"Simmons v. United States, 142 U. S. 148 (1891); United States v. Perez, 9
Wheat. 579, 580 (U. S. 1824) ("They [trial courts] are to exercise a sound dis-
cretion on the subject; and it is impossible to define all the circumstances which
would render it proper to interfere.") ; It re Ascher, 130 Mich. 540, 90 N. W. 418
(1902) ; State v. Bowman, 231 N. C. 51, 55, S. E. 2d 789 (1949) ; State v. Beal
199 N. C. 278, 154 S. E. 604 (1930) ; State v. Tyson, 138 N. C. 627, 50 S. E. 453
(1905) ; State v. Wiseman, 68 N. C. 203 (1873) ; State v. Barnes, 54 Wash. 493,
103 Pac. 792 (1909). But cf. In re Spier, 12 N. C. 491 (1828) and State v.
Garriques, 2 N. C. 241 (1795) where the discretionary power of the trial judge
was denied.
'0 United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579, 580 (U. S. 1824) ("But, after all,
they [trial courts] have the right to order the discharge; and the security which
the public have for faithful, sound and conscientious exercise of this discretion,
rests, in this, as in other cases, upon the responsibility of the judges, under their
oaths of office.") ; Andrews v. State, 174 Ala. 11, 56 So. 998 (1911) ; People v.
Simos, 345 Ill. 226, 178 N. E. 188 (1931) ; Ex parte Earle, 316 Mich. 295, 25 N. W.
2d 202 (1946) ; State v. Barnes, 54 Wash. 493, 103 Pac. 792 (1909).
11 State v. Leunig, 42 Ind. 541 (1873) ; State v. Klauer, 70 Kan. 383, 78 Pac.
802 (1904); People v. Parker, 145 Mich. 488, 108 N. W. 999 (1906); State v.
Conklin, 25 Neb. 784, 41 N. W. 788 (1889) ; Yarborough v. State, 90 Okla. Cr. R.
74, 210 P. 2d 375 (1949) ; State v. Bilton, 156 S. C. 324, 153 S. E. 269 (1930);
State v. Whitman, 93 Utah 557, 74 P. 2d 696 (1937).
" Finding of facts and setting them out in the record is emphasized in the North
Carolina cases. See State v. Beal, 199 N. C. 278, 154 S. E. 604 (1930) ; State v.
Cain, 175 N. C. 825, 95 S. E. 930 (1918) ; State v. Tyson, 138 N. C. 627, 50 S. E.
456 (1905) ; State v. Bailey, 65 N. C. 426 (1871).
State v. Dove, 222 N. C. 162, 22 S. E. 2d 231 (1942) ; State v. Beal, 199 N. C.
278, 154 S. E. 604 (1930) ; State v. Tyson, 138 N. C. 627, 50 S. E. 456 (1905).
This rule seems peculiar to North Carolina. But cf. State v. Bailey, 65 N. C. 426,
428 (1871) ("In inferior misdemeanors, such as assaults, batteries, forcible trespass
and the like, the Judges have a discretionary power to order mistrials, and in such
cases their decisions cannot be reviewed by this Court, but even here mistrials
should not be granted for slight causes. But in capital felonies, and in felonies
not capital, and in misdemeanors where infamous punishments may be inflicted, as
in perjury, conspiracy, and the like, the decisions of the Judges in the Court below
may be reviewed in this Court. In such cases the Judges should find the facts,
which this Court cannot review; but the law ,bearing upon the facts thus found
are the subject of review in this Court by an appeal after the final decision in the
Court below.").
"State v. Andrews, 166 N. C. 349, 81 S. E. 416 (1914).
15 State v. Guice, 201 N. C. 761, 161 S. E. 533 (1931); State v. Ellis, 200 N. C.
77, 156 S. E. 157 (1930) ; State v. Upton, 170 N. C. 769, 87 S. E. 328 (1915) ;
State v. Wiseman, 68 N. C. 203 (1873). But cf. State v. Bailey, 65 N. C. 426
(1871).
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If the jury is discharged over the objection of the defendant, and
on review it is determined that the surrounding circumstances and facts
did not in fact necessitate an order of mistrial, the reasons for the action
being legally insufficient, the plea of former jeopardy will be allowed.1 6
No definite rule can be formulated which will encompass all of the
different types of misconduct which will be declared to be legally suffi-
cient to support an order of mistrial. Each case must rest on its own
surrounding facts and circumstances.1 7  However, a juror's misconduct
on voir dire examination has been held to be misconduct sufficient to
sustain the withdrawal of a juror more often, perhaps, than any other
type of juror misconduct. Thus, in cases where a juror has falsely
sworn that he was not acquainted with the defendant ;1s withheld the fact
that he was friendly' 9 or partial20 to the defendant; concealed other
facts ;21 revealed that he had not told the truth concerning his scruples
as to conviction on circumstantial evidence ;22 and where he has fraudu-
lently gained access to the jury for the purpose of acquitting the de-
fendant,23 the withdrawal of a juror and the declaration of a mistrial
over the defendant's objection has been sustained.
Other types of misconduct by members of the jury which have been
held sufficient to sustaifi the withdrawal of a juror and the declaration
of a mistrial include: a juror's becoming separated from the other mem-
bers of the jury ;24 intoxication of a juror during trial25 and during
recess ;26 a juror's procuring liquor for other jurors ;27 a juror's asso-
" State ex rel. Manning v. Hines, 153 Fla. 711, 15 So. 2d 613 (1943) ; Jordan v.
State, 75 Ga. App. 815, 44 S. E. 2d 821 (1947) ; Maddox v. State, 230 Ind. 92, 102
N. E. 2d 225 (1951) ; Kamen v. Gray, 169 Kan. 664, 220 P. 2d 160 (1950), cert.
denied, 340 U. S. 890 (1950) ; Mullins v. Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 529, 80 S. E. 2d
606 (1935) ; State v. Prince, 63 N. C. 529 (1869).
"' For a collection of cases and situations where the jury was discharged over
the defendant's objection, see, WHARTON, CRimiNAL LAW, Vol. I, § 394 (1912).
"- Simmons v. United States, 142 U. S. 148 (1891).
" Helton v. State, 255 S. E. 2d 694 (Tenn. 1953).
20 Quinton v. State, 112 Neb. 684, 112 N. W. 881 (1924).
In  re Ascher, 130 Mich. 540, 90 N. W. 418 (1902).
" State v. Cain, 175 N. C. 825, 95 S. E.. 930 (1918).
" State v. Washington, 89 N. C. 535 (1883) (without defendant's knowledge);
State v. Bell, 81 N. C. 591 (1879) (at the instance of the defendant).
2 Etter v. State, 185 Tenn. 218, 205 S. W. 2d 1 (1947).
" In re Ascher, 130 Mich. 540, 90 N. W. 418 (1902) ; State v. Tyson, 138 N. C.
627, 50 S. E. 456 (1905) (upon examining the juror, judge found him to be in a
"nervous and besottled condition" and unfit to continue).
"0 Fetty v. State, 119 Neb. 619, 230 N. W. 440 (1930) (juror found unfit for
duty after being jailed for public drunkenness) ; State v. Tyson, 138 N. C. 627, 50
S. E. 456 (1905) (juror drank before the trial, during the trial, and during recess).
For a note concerning drunkenness of jurors and subsequent mistrials, see 9 NEB.
L. BULL. 215 (1930).2
" li re Ascher, 130 Mich. 540, 90 N. W. 418 (1902). This is an extreme ex-
ample of misconduct on the part of the jurors; they concealed facts on voir dire
examination, made statements showing prejudice, got the bailiff intoxicated, pro-
cured liquor for others, drank, and were found guilty of unauthorized communi-
cations.
19541
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ciation with an interested person ;28 and a juror's public statements
indicating his unfitness for duty after he had been impaneled.20 Con-
versely, where the bailiff bought beer at defendant's saloon which he
gave to the members of the jury ;30 or where the foreman spoke briefly
to the complaining witness ;31 and where a juror during a recess wan-
dered away from the custody of the officer in charge and visited a nearby
restaurant, 2 it has been held that the surrounding facts and circum-
stances did not constitute sufficient misconduct to sustain an order of
mistrial over the defendant's objection.
In the light of the former jeopardy provisions of our constitutions and
decisions,33 it is obvious that extreme caution should be used in ordering
discharge of a jury for alleged misconduct of one or more of its mem-
bers. A mistrial should be ordered only under urgent circumstances,
and especially in capital cases, only after a plain and obvious cause has
been shown to exist.3 4 When the misconduct of the juror or jurors
occurs outside the courtroom and not in the presence of the judge, a
competent judicial inquiry is necessary to determine the existence of a
necessity for a mistrial.3 5
Thus, where mere convenience is concerned, or where the conduct
is an irregularity only, and where the trial judge does not properly
investigate the surrounding circumstances, it is error to withdraw a
juror and declare a mistrial and a plea of former jeopardy should be
sustained.3 6
" People v. Bigg, 237 Mich. 58, 297 N. W. 70 (1941) ; People v. Diamond, 231
Mich. 484, 204 N. W. 105 (1925).
21 People v. Schepps, 231 Mich. 260, 203 N. W. 882 (1925) (juror stated pub-
licly that he thought confining the jurors reflected on his honor and thereby
prejudiced him against the state); People v. Sharp, 163 Mich. 79, 127 N. W. 758
(1910) ("When I am on a jury and I get my mind made up, by - , it will take
more than they have got to change it.") ; State v. Rector, 166 S. C. 335, 164 S. E.
865 (1931) (juror's statement that he would disregard incriminating testimony
because the witness was a Negro).
"o State v. Leunig, 42 Ind. 541 (1873) (jurors were taken by the bailiff, con-
trary to the orders of the court, to the public square, where he left them, and
procured beer for them from defendant's saloon. The judge ordered a discharge
of the jury, but on appeal this was reversed, the facts presenting no necessity for
such discharge).
"People v. Fishman, 64 N. Y. Misc. 256, 119 N. Y. Supp. 89 (Gen. Sess.
1909).
'
2 Mullins v. Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 529, 80 S. W. 2d 606 (1935).
:s See note 2 supra.
.' United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579 (U. S. 1824) ; In re Ascher, 130 Mich.
540, 90 N. W. 418 (1902) ; State v. Barnes, 54 Wash. 493, 103 Pac. 792 (1909).
"State v. Hansford, 76 Kan. 678, 92 Pac. 551 (1907) ; Salistean v. State, 115
Neb. 838, 215 N. W. 107 (1927); State v. Jefferson, 66 N. C. 309 (1872); Up-
church v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. R. 627, 38 S. W. 206 (1896).
"' See notes 25-27 supra; State v. Crocker, 239 N. C. 446, 80 S. E. 2d 243
(1954) ("Nor is there evidence that any of these jurors, when court convened
Friday morning, were not 'clothed in their right minds' and able to proceed with
their jury service. The record here shows that the testimony before the trial judge
was heard in the absence of the jury. There is no indication that any of the jurors
were questioned in open court or examined by a physician or other person relative
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When, after a thorough examination by the trial judge as to the
facts and circumstances surrounding the misconduct of the jury, he finds
that justice would be better served if the jury were discharged, the gen-
eral rule is that such a decision will not be disturbed on appeal, and on
subsequent retrial, double jeopardy will not attach.37
In view of the constitutional and common law prohibitions against
double jeopardy, and consistent with the basic theory that such mistrial
is to be used only in cases of manifest necessity, it is submitted that the
decision in the instant case is sound.38
GEORGE M. BRITT
Civil Procedure-Consent Judgments and Settlements-Right of
Liability Insurer to Bind Insured
The North Carolina motorist who reads his liability policy carefully
will probably notice that it contains a clause substantially as follows:
The Company shall (a) defend any suit against the insured al-
leging such injury, sickness, disease, or destruction and seeking
damages on account thereof, even if such suit is groundless, false,
or fraudulent; But the Company may make such investigation,
negotiation, and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems ex-
pedient.1 (Italics added.)
The usual policy also includes an express condition precedent to the
insurer's obligation to indemnify the insured which requires him to for-
ward immediately to the insurer any process, demand, notice, or pleading
served on him because of an accident in which the insured was involved.2
to their fitness and competence to serve as jurors when court convened on Friday
morning.") [Italics added.]
" See notes 18-24 supra. In the majority of cases in which a mistrial has been
sustained over defendant's objection, the trial judge has personally examined the
jurors to determine the necessity for a discharge of the jury.
" State v. Crocker, 239 N. C. 446, 453, 80 S. E. 2d 243 (1954). "Our holding
here is that the facts and circumstances set forth in the findings of fact are not of
such compelling nature as to justify a further relaxation of a rule of such import-
ance in safeguarding the life and liberty of a citizen against repeated prosecutions
for the same offense. The preservation of the salutary principle underlying the plea
of former jeopardy in capital cases is of far greater importance than the service by
this defendant of the prison term imposed by the judgment . . . upon her conviction
for manslaughter."
'Because of this wording the standard indemnity policy is more than a mere
contract of indemnity against actual loss in the sense of money paid. It is a con-
tract of insurance against liability for damages, and the insurer adopts the liability
of the insured, within policy coverage. State ex rel. Boney v. Central Mutual Ins.
Co. of Chicago, 213 N. C. 470, 196 S. E. 837 (1938).
If the plaintiff and the defendant are both insured by the same company, the
insureds must engage their own attorneys, and the policies become mere indemnity
policies. O'Morrow v. Borad, 27 Cal. 2d 794, 167 P. 2d 483 (1946).
'Hendrix v. Employer's Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 102 F. Supp. 31 (E. D. S. C.
1952) ; Martin v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 258 S. W. 2d 142 (Tex. Civ. App.
1953). See Stephens v. Childers, 236 N. C. 348, 72 S. E. 2d 849 (1952).
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These provisions seem reasonable enough, but their combined legal
effect can result in harsh injustice to the insured. For example, let us
suppose that an insured motorist was involved in an automobile collision
caused by the negligence of the other party. The insured's damage was
considerable, while the other motorist's injuries to person and property
were slight. Before the insured had engaged an attorney to prosecute
his claim against the other motorist, he was made defendant in an action
by the other party. In order to avail himself of the benefits of his policy,
he forwarded the process immediately to his insurer. Pursuant to its
contract right to control the defense8 the insurer employed attorneys to
defend the action against the insured. These attorneys settled with the
plaintiff and consented to an entry of judgment against the insured which
the insurer satisfied. May the insured, who had no knowledge of these
proceedings, now sue the negligent party?
Alabama, Massachusetts, Missouri, and Ohio have held that the
insured is barred by this consent judgment when he undertakes to sue
the other motorist,4 and New Jersey has held that, even when no con-
3 U. S. A. C. Transport, Inc. v. Corley, 202 F. 2d 8 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Traders &
General Ins. Co. v. Rudco Oil & Gas Co., 129 F. 2d 621 (10th Cir. 1942) ; Attle-
boro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort Marine, Accident & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 240 Fed. 573
(1st Cir. 1917) ; Abrams v. Factory Mutual Ins. Co., 298 Mass. 141, 10 N. E. 2d 82
(1937); Long v. Union Indemnity Co., 277 Mass. 428, 178 N. E. 737 (1931)
Wynnewood Lumber Co. v. The Travelers Ins. Co., 173 N. C. 269, 91 S. E. 94d(1917).
The right to control carries with it several correlative duties. The insurer is
liable to the insured when in bad faith it refuses to defend a claim within policy
coverage. Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Rudco Oil & Gas Co., 129 F. 2d 621
(10th Cir. 1942). It is also liable for the negligence of the attorneys engaged to
defend the action. Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort Marine, Accident, & Plate
Glass Ins. Co., 240 Fed. 573 (1st Cir. 1917). The insurer is liable to the insured
if its attorneys negligently allow a judgment in excess of policy coverage to be
entered against the insured. Abrams v. Factory Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 298
Mass. 141, 10 N. E. 2d 82 (1937). It has been said that the insurer owes a duty
to the insured to assert every proper and available defense in his behalf. Jewtraw
v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 280 App. Div. 150, 112 N. Y. S. 2d 727,
730 (3d Dep't 1952). See State Automobile Ins. Co. v. York, 104 F. 2d 730 (4th
Cir. 1939), cert. denied 308 U. S. 591 (1939).
However, in Wynnewood Lumber Co. v. The Travelers Ins. Co., 173 N. C. 269,
91 S. E. 946 (1917) where the injured party recovered against the insured an
amount in excess of the value of the policy, it was held that the insurer was not
liable for refusing to settle with the injured party at a figure within policy cover-
age, such settlement being within the discretion of the insurer, who would be liable
only for fraud, negligence, or failure to act in good faith.
'A.B.C. Truck Lines, Inc. v. Kenemer, 247 Ala. 543, 25 So. 2d 511 (1946).
This case is a good example of how the rule sometimes works injustice. While
the insured's action against the owner of the other vehicle was pending in the
Alabama trial court, the defendant rushed over to Georgia and served agents of
the insured with process. The insured's agents called in the insurer, which de-
fended the action in the Georgia trial court. However, defendant obtained verdict
and judgment against the insured. Then the defendant pleaded this Georgia judg-
men in bar of insured's suit in Alabama. The plea was allowed, and the insured
lost its day in court. Its officers had no knowledge of the Georgia proceedings.
The principal factor working against the insured was that the Alabama court could
not set aside a Georgia court's judgment unless the judgment was void on its face.
Brown, ., dissented vigorously.
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sent judgment was entered, a settlement in and of itself is nevertheless
a bar to any subsequent action initiated by the insured, arising out of
the same transaction.5 However, both as to settlements and consent
judgments, the majority rule is contra.6 Thus, most jurisdictions which
have considered the question hold that the attorney hired by the insurer
to defend the action against the insured has no authority, express or
implied, to impair any substantive rights of the insured.7
Some of the courts among the majority rely on the limited nature of
the authority of the insurer's attorney,8 while others have held that the
insurer's attorney cannot in any way be considered an agent of the in-
Long v. Union Indemnity Co., 277 Mass. 428, 178 N. E. 737 (1931); Keller v.
Keklikian, 362 Mo. 919, 244 S. W. 2d 1001 (1951) (settlement coupled with "dis-
missal with prejudice") ; Ross v. Stricker, 153 Ohio St. 153, 91 N. E. 2d 18 (1950)
(verdict rendered against insured, judgment entered on the verdict; insured not
allowed to set aside judgment satisfied by the insurer without his consent).
"Kelleher v. Lozzi, 7 N. J. 17, 80 A. 2d 196 (1951), rehearing denied, May 14,
1951. See Note, 51 CoL. L. REv. 1062 (1951).
6 Settlement by insurer's attorneys no bar: U. S. A. C. Transport Inc. v. Corley,
202 F. 2d 8 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Fikes v. Johnson, 220 Ark. 448, 248 S. W. 2d 362
(1952) ; Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. Campbell Coal Co., 57 Ga. App. 540, 196 S. E.
279 (1938) ; Last v. Brains, 238 Ill. App. 82 (1925) ; Emery v. Litchard, 137 Misc.
885, 245 N. Y. Supp. 209 (Sup. Ct. 1930) ; Jetton v. Polk, 17 Tenn. App. 395, 68
S. W. 2d 127 (1933) ; Owen v. Dixon, 162 Va. 601, 175 S. E. 41 (1934) ; Pater-
noster v. Swick, 43 Luz. L. Rx. 119 (Pa., June 5, 1953).
The New Jersey lower courts have twice held that an unauthorized settlement
by the insurer's attorneys is no bar to an action by the insured, distinguishing
Kelleher v. Lozzi, 7 N. J. 17, 80 A. 2d 196 (1951). Isaacson v. Boswell, 18 N. J.
Super. 95, 86 A. 2d 695 (App. Div. 1952) ; DeCarlucci v. Brasley, 16 N. J. Super.
48, 83 A. 2d 823 (L. 1951).
Burnham v. Williams, 198 Mo. App. 18, 194 S. W. 751 (1917) held that the
settlement by the insurer's attorneys did not bar the insured's claim. Keller v.
Keklikian, 362 Mo. 919, 244 S. W. 2d 1001 (1951) did not expressly overrule this
decision, but involved the question of failure to assert a compulsory counterclaim
before the "dismissal with prejudice."
See also American Trust & Banking Co. v. Parsons, 21 Tenn. App. 202, 108
S. W. 2d 187 (1937) (insured never served with process).
Where the insurer's attorneys settled with claimant, and insurer became in-
solvent before payment, it has been held that the settlement was not binding on the
insured, when the claimant undertook to collect from the insured. Countryman v.
Breen, 241 App. Div. 392, 271 N. Y. Supp. 744 (4th Dep't 1934) ; Haluka v. Baker,
66 Ohio App. 308, 34 N. E. 2d 68 (1941). Also, when the insurer's attorneys
withdrew from the case because of the insurer's sudden insolvency and what was
in effect a judgment by default was entered against insured, this default judgment
was vacated. Fessler v. Weiss, 348 111. App. 21, 107 N. E. 2d 795 (1952).
'Even in the jurisdictions in the minority on this point there is no problem
where the policy is a combined collision-liability policy, for the insured then has
no substantive rights to be impaired. Upon full payment to the insured of damages
suffered by him, the insurer is subrogated, and as the real party in interest may
maintain suit against the other motorist. Burgess v. Trevathan, 236 N. C. 157,
72 S. E. 2d 231 (1952) ; Underwood v. Dooley, 197 N. C. 100, 147 S. E. 686 (1929).
Of course, the insured may still lose his cause of action for any damage to person
or property not covered by the policy or for which the insurer has not made him
whole.
' Fikes v. Johnson, 220 Ark. 448, 248 S. W. 2d 362 (1952) ; Fessler v. Weiss,
348 IIl. App. 21, 107 N. E. 2d 795 (1952); Burnham v. Williams, 198 Mo. App.
18, 194 S. W. 751 (1917) ; Countryman v. Breen, 241 App. Div. 392, 271 N. Y.
Supp. 744 (4th Dep't 1934) ; Jetton v. Polk, 17 Tenn. App. 395, 68 S. W. 2d 127(1933) ; Paternoster v. Swick, 43 Luz L. REG. 119 (Pa., June 5, 1953).
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sured.9 The courts adopting the limited agency view (i.e., holding that
an attorney cannot without express authority bind his client by a settle-
ment or entry of a consent judgment) are supported by the weight of
authority.10 On the other hand, the courts rejecting the agency argu-
ment are also supported by authority, for it is a cardinal principle of
agency that the principal is allowed some measure of control over his
agent," and under the terms of the policy it would seem clear that the
insured has no control over the conduct of the litigation. 12 Furthermore,
the insurance company is only incidentally acting on behalf of the in-
'U. S. A. C. Transport Inc. v. Corley, 202 F. 2d 8 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Foremost
Dairies, Inc. v. Campbell Coal Co., 57 Ga. App. 540, 196 S. E. 279 (1938) ; Last
v. Brains, 238 Ill. App. 82 (1925); Isaacson v. Boswell, 18 N. J. Super. 95, 86
A. 2d 695 (App. Div. 1952); DeCarlucci v. Brasley, 16 N. J. Super. 48, 83 A. 2d
823 (L. 1951) ; Haluka v. Baker, 66 Ohio App. 308, 34 N. E. 2d 68 (1941). But
cf. Stephens v. Childers, 236 N. C. 348, 72 S. E. 2d 849 (1952) which holds that
the insurer's attorney is the agent of the insured, and that the attorney's negligence
is imputable to insured, for the purposes of vacation of judgment on the grounds
of excusable neglect. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-220 (1953).
In Emery v. Litchard, 137 Misc. 885, 245 N. Y. Supp. 209 (Sup. Ct. 1930) it
was said that a settlement was not an admission of liability, since the question of
liability of the parties was for the jury to decide.
"0 Crawford v. Tucker, 258 Ala. 658, 64 So. 2d 411 (1952) ; Fresno City High
School Dist. v. Dillon, 34 Cal. App. 2d 636, 94 P. 2d 86 (1939); DeLong v.
Owsley's Executrix, 308 Ky. 128, 213 S. W. 2d 806 (1948) ; Sudekum v. Fasnachts'
Estate, 236 Mo. App. 455, 157 S. W. 2d 264 (1942); Town of Bath v. Norman,
226 N. C. 502, 39 S. E. 2d 363 (1940) ; Smith v. Land and Mineral Co., 217 N. C.
346, 8 S. E. 2d 225 (1940) ; Morgan v. Hood, 211 N. C. 91, 189 S. E. 115 (1937);
Early v. Burns, 142 S. W. 2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
However, it is often said that the attorney is presumed to have authority to
bind his client, and the party seeking to avoid the settlement, compromise, judgment
or stipulation has the burden of overcoming this presumption. City of Medford v.
Corbett, 302 Mass. 573, 20 N. E. 2d 402 (1939) ; Renken v. Sidebotham, 227 S. W.
2d 99 (Mo. App. 1950) ; Ledford v. Ledford, 229 N. C. 373, 49 S. E. 2d 794 (1948) ;
Keen V. Parker, 217 N. C. 378, 8 S. E. 2d 209 (1940) ; Wadden v. Sanger, 250
S. W. 2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
Some courts hold that an attorney has authority to bind his client by a settle-
ment or entry of a consent judgment, implied from the nature of his employment.
Ferrara v. Genduso, 214 Ind. 99, 14 N. E. 2d 580 (1938) ; Bielby v. Allender, 330
Mich. 12, 46 N. W. 2d 445 (1951) ; Rader v. Campbell, 134 W. Va. 485, 61 S. E.
2d 228 (1949). See Harrington v. Buchanan, 222 N. C. 698, 24 S. E. 2d 534 (1943).
"Isaacson v. Boswell, 18 N. J. Super. 95, 86 A. 2d 695 (App. Div. 1952);
Haluka v. Baker, 66 Ohio App. 308, 34 N. E. 2d 68 (1941); RESTATEMENT,
AGENCY §§ 1(1) ; 14, comment b (1933). See also RESTATEM ENT AGENCY §§2(3),
385 (1933).
It should be noted here that for the purposes of privileged communications be-
tween attorney and client, the insured is considered the client of the insurer's
attorney. N. Y. Casualty Co. v. Superior Court In and For the County of San
Francisco, 30 Cal. App. 2d 130, 85 P. 2d 965 (1938) ; State v. Krich, 123 N. J. L.
519, 9 A. 2d 803 (Supt. Ct. 1939) ; Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corp., 139 Misc. 699,
249 N. Y. Supp. 631 (Sup. Ct. 1931) ; Westminster Airways, Ltd. v. Kuwait Oil
Co. (1951) 1 K. B. 134. But the policy giving rise to the privilege is obviously
not incompatible with a holding that an insurer contracting to defend an action
against the insured may not prejudice his substantive rights; it does not follow
that because of the attachment of the attorney-client relationship for purposes of the
privilege, the insured stands to lose his cause of action because of the attorney's
default.
" See note 3 supra.
[Vol. 32
NOTES AND COMMENT
sured, but is furthering its own interests13 in fulfilling its express con-
tract obligations to the insured.14
North Carolina has never decided the question of the authority of
the insurer's attorney to bind the insured by a settlement or consent
judgment which prejudices the insured's substantive rights. In two
cases the question could have been decided, but the counsel for the in-
sured collaterally attacked the consent judgments which had been entered
against the insured, and the question was therefore not properly raised.15
Since there has been no definite holding by the North Carolina Court
that the insurer's attorneys are authorized to bargain away the substan-
tive rights of the insured, the way seems clear for a successful attack
against the judgment by means of a motion in the cause.16  Forasmuch
" Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort Marine, Accident & Plate Glass Ins. Co.,
240 Fed. 573 (1st Cir. 1917) ; Hayes v. Gessner, 315 Mass. 366, 52 N. E. 2d 968
(1944) ; Long v. Union Indemnity Co., 277 Mass. 428, 178 N. E. 737 (1931).
' Goldstein v. Bernstein, 315 Mass. 329, 52 N. E. 2d 559 (1943) ; Abrams v.
Factory Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 298 Mass. 141, 10 N. E. 2d 82 (1937).
" LaLonde v. Hubbard, 202 N. C. 771, 164 S. E. 359 (1932) ; Stone v. Carolina
Coach Co., 238 N. C. 662, 78 S. E. 2d 605 (1953). In the first cited case, counsel
for the insured took a voluntary nonsuit when the trial judge refused to allow the
plaintiff to introduce evidence that the former judgment had been rendered without
his consent, and then appealed to the Supreme Court. Ih the second cited case
counsel for the insured filed a reply to defendant's amended answer -which set up
the consent judgment as a bar to plaintiff's cause of action, the trial judge over-
ruled defendant's demurrer to the reply, but the Supreme Court reversed, on the
ground that a consent judgment cannot be collaterally attacked.
It is well settled in this state that a consent judgment entered without authority
cannot be collaterally impeached. Coker v. Coker, 224 N. C. 450, 31 S. E. 2d 364
(1944) ; Gibson v. Gordon, 213 N. C. 666, 197 S. E. 135 (1938) ; Cason v. Shute,
211 N. C. 195, 189 S. E. 494 (1937) ; Morris v. Patterson, 180 N. C. 484, 105 S. E.
25 (1920). The proper procedure for setting aside consent judgments is by a
motion in the cause. Hall v. Shippers Express, Inc. 234 N. C. 38, 65 S. E. 2d 333
(1951) ; King v. King, 225 N. C. 639, 35 S. E. 2d 893 (1945) ; Gibson v. Gordon,
213 N. C. 666, 197 S. E. 135 (1938) ; Boucher v. Union Trust Co., 211 N. C. 377,
190 S. E. 226 (1937) ; Dietz v. Bolch, 209 N. C. 202, 183 S. E. 384 (1936) ; Bizzell
v. Auto Tire & Equipment Co., 182 N. C. 98, 108 S. E. 439 (1921). But see State
ex rel. Jones v. Griggs, 223 N. C. 279, 25 S. E. 2d 862 (1943) ; Morris v. Patterson,
180 N. C. 484, 105 S. E. 25 (1920). See also N. C. GiuN. STAT. § 1-207 (1953).
If the consent judgment is attacked in the same county by independent action,
the court may treat the action as a motion in the cause, rather than to dismiss.
Coker v. Coker, 224 N. C. 450, 31 S. E. 2d 364 (1944).
A judgment which is irregular is also open to attack only by a motion in the
cause. Collins v. State Highway Commission, 237 N. C. 277, 74 S. E. 2d 709
(1953) ;MACINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES
§ 653 (1929). As regards vacating a judgment because of surprise or excusable
neglect under authority of N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-220 (1953) see Note, 31 N. C. L.
Rv. 324 (1953), and Moore v. Deal, 239 N. C. 224, 79 S. E. 2d 507 (1954).
When the record shows the judgment to be void, a motion in the cause is not
necessary to vacate it. Williams v. Trammel, 230 N. C. 575, 55 S. E. 2d 81 (1949) ;
Powell v. Turpin, 224 N. C. 67, 29 S. E. 2d 26 (1944) (collateral attack allowed) ;
Clark v. Carolina Homes, Inc., 189 N. C. 703, 128 S. E. 20 (1925) (may be quashed
ex ilero vwtu). And see Ledford v. Ledford, 229 N. C. 373, 376, 49 S. E. 2d 794,
796 (1948), and Town of Bath v. Norman, 226 N. C. 502, 505, 39 S. E. 2d 363, 364
(1946) for dicta that a consent judgment is void if such consent does not exist at
the time the court gives the judgment contract its sanction.
" The present Chief Justice Barnhill stated in Stone v. Carolina Coach Co.,
238 N. C. 662, 665, 78 S. E. 2d 605, 607 (1953) that: "If plaintiff wishes to proceed
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as a consent judgment is nothing more than a contract between the par-
ties spread upon the records and given the court's sanction, 17 it would
seem that consent by both parties is necessary to make this contract
binding,18 and it is well recognized in this state that insufficient authority
in an attorney to consent to judgment is sufficient reason for setting it
aside.19 Furthermore, North Carolina follows the weight of authority
in holding that an attorney by reason of his office has no implied author-
ity to compromise away his client's cause of action,20 or consent to entry
of judgment against him.21
Yet arguments can be made that the insured should not be allowed
to escape the full effect of the settlement or consent judgment. First,
although by the terms of the policy the insured has no control over the
insurer's attorneys and cannot demand that he be notified of the develop-
ments in the case, in some situations he will have sufficient notice. If
the claimant's complaint is verified, then verification of the answer is
mandatory in North Carolina,2 2 and since the verification is an affidavit
of the party it is to be made by the party himself.23  If the insured is
further in this cause, he must first have the Parker judgment vacated by independ-
ent action or motion in the cause, as he may be advised. It is not proper for us
at this time to express an opinion as to which is the appropriate remedy."
" King v. King, 225 N. C. 639, 35 S. E. 2d 893 (1945) ; State ex rel. Jones v.
Griggs, 223 N. C. 279, 25 S. E. 2d 862 (1943) ; Keen v. Parker, 217 N. C. 378, 8
S. E. 2d 209 (1940) ; Morris v. Patterson, 180 N. C. 484, 105 S. E. 25 (1920);
Gardiner v. May, 172 N. C. 192, 89 S. E. 955 (1916).
18 Pack v. Newman, 232 N. C. 397, 61 S. E. 2d 90 (1950) ; Ledford v. Ledford,
229 N. C. 373, 49 S. E. 2d 794 (1948) ; Gibson v. Gordon, 213 N. C. 666, 197 S. E.
135 (1938) ; Dietz v. Bolch, 209 N. C. 202, 183 S. E. 384 (1936) ; Bank of Glade
Spring v. McEwen, 160 N. C. 414, 76 S. E. 222 (1912).
"
8Town of Bath v. Norman, 226 N. C. 502, 39 S. E. 2d 363 (1946) ; Morgan
v. Hood, 211 N. C. 91, 189 S. E. 115 (1937); Dietz v. Bolch, 209 N. C. 202, 183
S. E. 384 (1936) ; Peoples Bank of Burnsville v. Penland, 206 N. C. 323, 173 S. E.
345 (1934) ; Bizzell v. Auto Tire & Equipment Co., 182 N. C. 98, 108 S. E. 439
(1921) ; Chavis v. Brown, 174 N. C. 122, 93 S. E. 471 (1917) ; Gardiner v. May,
172 N. C. 192, 89 S. E. 955 (1916) ; Hoell v. White, 169 N. C. 640, 86 S. E. 569
(1915) ; Bank of Glade Spring v. McEwen, 160 N. C. 414, 76 S. E. 222 (1912).
Where ,both parties actually consent to the judgment, it is necessary to obtain
the consent of both parties before setting it aside. Ledford v. Ledford, 229 N. C.
373, 49 S. E. 2d 794 (1948) ; King v. King, 225 N. C. 639, 35 S. E. 2d 893 (1945) ;
Keen v. Parker, 217 N. C. 378, 8 S. E. 2d 209 (1940) ; Boucher v. Union Trust
Co., 211 N. C. 377, 190 S. E. 226 (1937).
There is some language in the reports to the effect that a consent judgment
obtained by fraud and mistake, being nothing more than a contract, may be attacked
in an independent action. Morris v. Patterson, 180 N. C. 484, 105 S. E. 25 (1920) ;
Gardiner v. May, 172 N. C. 192, 89 S. E. 955 (1916) ; Bank of Glade Spring v.
McEwen, 160 N. C. 414, 76 S. E. 222 (1912).
" Town of Bath v. Norman, 226 N. C. 502, 39 S. E. 2d 363 (1946) ; Bizzell v.
Auto Tire & Equipment Co., 182 N. C. 98, 108 S. E. 439 (1921) ; Chavis v. Brown,
174 N. C. 122, 93 S. E. 471 (1917).
"1 Morgan v. Hood, 211 N. C. 91, 189 S. E. 115 (1937) ; Bank of Glade Spring
v. McEwen, 160 N. C. 414, 76 S. E. 222 (1912).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-144 (1953). But in Stone v. Carolina Coach Co., 238
N. C. 662, 78 S. E. 2d 605 (1953) the complaint in the former action was verified,
but the answer filed by the insurer's attorneys was not. Transcript of Record,
pp. 12, 15.
2
' McINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES § 367
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called upon to verify the answer, or any other pleadings, he would have
sufficient notice of the progress of the action to be represented by his
own attorney, who would be charged with prevention of any compro-
mise prejudicial to the insured's interests.24 Furthermore, most policies
of liability insurance contain as an express condition a "cooperation
clause" 25 providing that the insured must cooperate in the defense, else
the insurer is relieved of liability.26  If the cause is tried doubtless the
insured will cooperate and his presence would give him sufficient op-
portunity to object to any compromises detrimental to his interests.
Second, one court which has consistently refused relief to the insured
in this situation has said that the insured cannot accept on the one hand
the benefit of the defense of the action and .the satisfaction of the claim
against him, and on the other hand contest the insurer's actions which
work to his detriment.2 7
Third, an attorney engaged contemporaneously by the insured to
assert his claim against the other party within the framework of the
action against the insured should certainly keep in contact with the
insurer's attorneys to prevent action prejudicial to his client's interests,
for such default might be chargeable to the client.28
(1929). When the action or defense is founded upon a written instrument for the
payment of money and the instrument is in the possession of an agent or attorney,
or if all the material allegations of the pleadings to be verified are within the per-
sonal knowledge of the agent or attorney, such agent or attorney may make the
affidavit. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-146 (1953). These two exceptions seem to be
inapplicable in an action for damages arising out of a motor vehicle collision.
" In La Londe v. Hubbard, 202 N. C. 771, 164 S. E. 359 (1932), the insured
defendant had engaged his own attorney. However, the attorney knew nothing of
the agreement to enter the consent judgment and therefore he did not sign it. The
court held that a consent judgment was not open to attack just because it was not
signed by all of the insured's attorneys of record.
If insured's own attorney arranges a dismissal of the action against his client,
upon agreement that a settlement will be made out of court, the wording of the
stipulation may constitute a retraxit, which would operate to bar insured's claim
much as would a consent judgment. Steele v. Beaty, 215 N. C. 680, 2 S. E. 2d
854 (1939). This opinion also includes an excellent discussion of types of dis-
missals, etc., which will and which will not operate as res judicata. Id., at 682-685,
2 S. E. 2d at 855-857 (1939).
n These clauses typically state that the insured is to cooperate with the insurer,
and upon request of the insurer is to attend hearings and trials, and assist in effect-
ing settlements, giving evidence, obtaining the attendance of witnesses, and so forth.
0 Shafer v. Utica Mutual Ins. Co., 248 App. Div. 279, 289 N. Y. Supp. 577
(4th Dep't 1936) ; MacClure v. Accident & Casualty Ins. Co. of Winterthur, Switz-
erland, 229 N. C. 305, 49 S. E. 2d 742 (1948) ; Hoffman v. Labutzke, 233 Wis 365,
289 N. W. 652 (1940).
Yet, it is clear that this clause is for the convenience of the insurer, and when
the parties reach a compromise agreement early in the case, the clause never comes
into play, and the insured has no notice of the developments in the case.
" Hayes v. Gessner, 315 Mass. 366, 52 N. E. 2d 968 (1944). See Keller v.
Keklikian, 362 Mo. 919, 244 S. W. 2d 1001 (1951).
" Among other things, the attorney must know that a counterclaim is in effect
compulsory in such actions, and that if a counterclaim is not pleaded his client will
be forever barred from recovery. McLean Trucking Co. v. Carolina Scenic Stages,
Inc., 95 F. Supp. 437 (M. D. N. C. 1951).
The principle of res judicata was established to prevent needless litigation, and
1954]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Fourth, in addition to being an express grant of authority to settle,
might not the words "but the Company may make such investigation,
negotiation, and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient"
be construed as granting authority2" to consent to entry of judgment
against the insured? Massachusetts has so held. 0
In 1932 the Massachusetts legislature, recognizing the unfairness to
the insured resulting from this decision binding him,3 ' enacted a statute
to the effect that a judgment entered by agreement, secured by bond or
liability policy, would not operate as a bar to any subsequent action by
the insured or bonded defendant unless such agreement was signed by
the defendant in person.3 2  Should the need become apparent, the North
Carolina General Assembly might enact a comparable measure.
The General Assembly in 1953 adopied the Motor Vehicle Safety
Responsibility Act which is in effect in most states and which provides,
inter alia, that the insurer's liability is to become absolute whenever
bars not only all questions actually litigated, but those which could have been
raised as well. Angel v. Bullington, 330 U. S. 183, 186 (1946). This principle bars
the parties and their privies as to all questions litigated in one-transaction automo-
bile accident cases. Stone v. Carolina Coach Co., 238 N. C. 662, 78 S. E. 2d 605(1953) (insured party barred from proceeding against employer of driver who hadjudgment against insured) ; Pinnix v. Griffin, 221 N. C. 348, 20 S. E. 2d 366 (1942)(injured party barred from suing employer where he had already obtained a judg-
ment, although inadequate, against employee); Leary v. Virginia-Carolina Joint
Stock Land Bank, 215 N. C. 501, 2 S. E. 2d 570 (1939) (plaintiff's agent-driver
was adjudged negligent in action against him by bank's driver-employee; judgment
against plaintiff's agent-driver estops plaintiff from proceeding against bank).
There are many cases dealing with the doctrine of res judicata as it applies to
co-defendants who are also joint tort-feasors. Where A obtains verdict and judg-
ment, or settlement, or consent judgment against B, and B is later sued by C, A
may successfully plead res judicata when B joins A as co-defendant for contri-
bution under N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-240 (1953). Stansel v. McIntyre, 237 N. C.148, 74 S. E. 2d 345 (1953) ; Snyder v. Kenan Oil Co., 235 N. C. 119, 68 S. E. 2d
805 (1951); Herring v. Queen City Coach Co., 234 N. C. 51, 65 S. E. 2d 505(1951) ; Tarkington v. Rock Hill Printing & Finishing Co., 230 N. C. 354, 53 S. E.
2d 269 (1949).
Where judgment is entered against co-defendant joint tort-feasors, and is satis-fied by 'both, the plea of res judicata is available in subsequent actions between them.
Lumberton Coach Co. v. Stone, 235 N. C. 619, 70 S. E. 2d 673 (1952). But whereA sues B and B brings cross action against C as joint tort-feasor, but A does not
amend his pleadings to state a cause of action against C, the question of C'sliability to A is not in issue, and A may sue C in a subsequent action. Powell v.
Ingram, 231 N. C. 427, 57 S. E. 2d 315 (1950). As to the necessity for adversarypleadings between all the parties, see Bunge v. Yager, 236 Minn. 245, 52 N. W. 2d
446 (1952).
" In Morgan v. Hood, 211 N. C. 91, 189 S. E. 115 (1937) it was held that
authority to compromise a case, and to consent to a judgment founded on such
compromise, cannot be conferred upon an attorney by an agent who was authorized
by his principal to employ an attorney to defend the action. Accord, AttleboroMfg. Co. v. Frankfort Marine, Accident and Plate Glass Ins. Co., 240 Fed. 573(1st Cir. 1917). But cf. A. B. C. Truck Lines Inc. v. Kenemer, 247 Ala. 543, 25
So. 2d 511 (1946) ; Petition of Preferred Accident Ins. Co. of N. Y., 273 App. Div.
993, 78 N. Y. S. 2d 674 (1st Dep't 1948).
"°Long v. Union Indemnity Co., 277 Mass. 428, 178 N. E. 737 (1931) (entry
of consent judgment was an appropriate method of settlement).
" Note 30 supra.
"
2 MASS. ANN. LAws c. 231, § 140(A) (1933).
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injury occurs, and that no violation of the policy shall defeat or void it.33
This statutory provision would seem to be an unequivocal expression of
public policy for the protection of injured parties3 4 within policy cov-
erage by making certain that the insurance company cannot avoid pay-
ment because of a breach by the insured of some of the policy condi-
tions.35  This provision, however, does not relieve the insured of any
of the pressure which forces him to forward summons and other process
immediately to the insurer. For, he would still be liable to the insurer
for failure to fulfill his contract obligations if he allowed an unreasonable
time to elapse in order to engage a personal attorney before forwarding
the process.
36
R. G. HALL, JR.
Income Tax-Deductibility of Attorney's Fees for Tax Purposes
The deductibility of legal fees for income tax purposes is an important
factor to be considered by lawyers and laymen alike. If a client is in the
fifty per cent income tax bracket, the Federal Government will, in effect,
pay one half of any fee deducted by the client. This may well be an
influencing factor in determining the overall financial consequences of
employing legal counsel.
In order to be deductible, the fee must fall into the category of busi-
ness or non-business expenses as set out in the Internal Revenue Code.
If the fee covers both deductible and non-deductible items, it should be
allocated between the two, and failure to so allocate may result in the
disallowance of the entire amount.1 The provision for business expenses
requires that an expense, to be deductible, must be both ordinary and
necessary, and incurred in carrying on a trade or business.2 The pro-
33 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279(f) (1953).
"' Courts of other states have construed this provision as an absolute protection
of injured third parties. Century Indemnity Co. v. Simon, 77 F. Supp. 221 (D. C.
N. J. 1948); Farm Bureau Automobile Ins. Co. v. Martin, 97 N. H. 196, 84 A. 2d
823 (1951); Atlantic Casualty Co. v. Bingham, 10 N. J. 460, 92 A. 2d 1 (1952),
affirming 18 N. J. Super. 170, 86 A. 2d 792 (App. Div. 1952); Stonborough v.
Preferred Accident Ins. Co. of New York, 292 N. Y. 154, 54 N. E. 2d 342 (1944),
affirming 266 App. Div. 838, 43 N. Y. S. 2d 512 (1st Dep't 1944), affirming 180
Misc. 339, 40 N. Y. S. 2d 480 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
"' Such as breach of the "cooperation clause," or failure to forward immediately
all summons and process received.
O Where the insurer is absolutely liable to make the injured party whole, be-
cause of a statute such as N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279(f) (1953), a cause of action
accrues against the insured when he fails to fulfill the policy conditions to the preju-
dice of the insurer. Illinois Casualty Co. v. Krol, 324 Ill. App. 478, 58 N. E. 2d
473 (1944); Service Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Aronofsky, 308 Mass. 249, 31
N. E. 2d 837 (1941) ; American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Big Four Taxi Co., 111
W. Va. 462, 163 S. E. 40 (1932).
'Jordan v. Commissioner, 12 B. T. A. 423 (1928).
'INT. REv. CoDE § 2 3(a) (1) (A) provides for the deduction of "all ordinary
and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any
trade or business. .. ."
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vision for non-business expenses allows deduction of those which are
ordinary and necessary, and incurred in the production or collection of
income or for the management, conservation, or maintenance of income
producing property.3 These sections must be construed in pari materia,4
and any deduction under the non-business provision is subject, except
for the requirement of being incurred in connection with a trade or busi-
ness, to all the limitations that apply to the business expense category.5
Whether the expense involved meets the "ordinary and necessary"
requirements in relation to a proper business or non-business activity is
a question of fact to be determined as such.6 The test. the courts apply
in making this determination is what is nornml or usual-ordinary and
necessary according to the ways of conduct and the forms of speech
prevailing in the business world.7  Such expenses need not relate di-
rectly to the production of income; it being enough if such expense is
directly connected with or proximately results from the conduct of the
business.8
The question whether to apply the "ordinary and necessary" test to
the circumstances then prevailing or to the events causing those circum-
stances posed a difficult problem. For example, a 1928 case said0 ".... a
suit ordinarily, and as a general thing at least, necessarily requires the
employment of counsel . . .", thereby applying the test to the prevailing
circumstances. Later cases'0 have reasoned that it is never necessary
to violate the law in managing a business, and have applied the test to
the events causing those circumstances. This question was settled in
Commissioner v. Heininger," the Supreme Court holding that the cir-
cumstances then prevailing were controlling.
Prior to the Bingham Trust 2 case, legal expenses incurred in income
tax litigation were consistently denied.' 3 However, legal fees incurred
in determining liability on income tax are now uniformly allowed on
'INT. REV. CODE § 23 (a) (2) provides that "in the case of an individual all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year for the
production or collection of income, or for the management, conservation, or main-
tenance of property held for the production of income" are deductible.
' Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U. S. 365 (1945).
'McDonald v. Commissioner, 323 U. S. 57 (1944).
'Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U. S. 365 (1945).
" "The standard set up by the statute is not a rule of law; it is rather a way of
life. Life in all its fullness must supply the answer to the riddle." Welch v.
Helvering, 290 U. S. 111 (1933).
' Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U. S. 365 (1945) ; Kornhauser v. United States,
276 U. S. 145 (1928) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.23(a)-15 (1953).
' Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U. S. 145 (1928).
0 Deputy, Administratrix, et al. v. du Pont, 308 U. S. 488 (1940) ; Outdoor
Advertising Bureau, Inc. v. Commissioner, 89 F. 2d 878 (2d Cir. 1937) ; Burroughs
Building Material Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F. 2d 178 (2d Cir. 1931).
"1 Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U. S. 467 (1943).
"Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U. S. 365 (1945).
13 Higgins v. Commissioner, 2 T. C. 948, aff'd, 143 F. 2d 654 (1st Cir. 1944);
Coffey v. Commissioner, 1 T. C. 579, aff'd, 141 F. 2d 204 (5th Cir. 1944) ; Hord
v. Commissioner, P-H 1945 TC MEm. DEC. 1 43,283 (1943).
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the ground that the expense always concerns taxable income. These
deductible fees may cover preparation of returns, filing refund claims,
or litigation of tax deficiencies. 14 Such deduction is allowed despite
the imposition of penalties for civil fraud. 15
Legal fees incurred in contesting gift tax deficiencies are not de-
ductible for the reason that neither the gifts nor the expenses were made
for the production or collection of income.1 6  Likewise, where an heir
incurred legal expenses in obtaining a refund of federal estate taxes,
the deduction of such expense was refused because the action was to
obtain money due as the result of an inheritance, not taxable income.
However, that portion of the attorney's fees allocable to interest in-
volved was deductible. 17
Other cases have allowed deduction of attorney's fees incurred in
reorganization of the taxpayer's estate ;18 dissolution and liquidation of
a corporation ;19 seeking to prevent conviction of a lawyer on a charge
of obstructing justice;20 creation of an employee pension plan and ad-
vice relating to financial operations ;21 determining the right of a minor
actor to his earnings ;22 obtaining reinstatement as co-executor of de-
ceased husband's estate ;23 defending position as a corporate officer and
director ;24 defending against a suit for fraud ;25 ascertaining rights under
an employment contract ;26 and answering questions by a movie script
writer before a Congressional committee investigating communistic in-
filtration into the movie industry and his business.27
Where a legal expense is incurred in a business transaction, produc-
14 U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23 (a) -15 (1953); Bingham v. Commissioner, 325
U. S. 365 (1945); Armour v. Commissioner, 6 T. C. 359 (1946); Connelly v.
Commissioner, 6 T. C. 744 (1946); Greene Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 5 T. C.
314 (1945).
Goodman v. Commissioner, 9 T. C. M. 789, aff'd, 200 F. 2d 681 (2d Cir. 1953).
Lykes v. United States, 343 U. S. 118 (1952) ; Cobb v. Commissioner, 173
F. 2d 711 (6th Cir. 1949).17 Edmunds v. United States, 71 F. Supp. 29 (E. D. Mo. 1947).
'" Bagley v. Commissioner, 8 T. C. 130 (1947), involved fees for advice to the
taxpayer concerning the purchase of bonds, loans to corporate officers for the pur-
pose of protecting taxpayer's investment in the corporation, and the merits and
legal aspects of a plan submitted to taxpayer by a firm of estate planners for the
rearrangement and reinvestment of the taxpayer's entire estate.
"9 United States v. Arcade Co. et al., 203 F. 2d 230 (6th Cir. 1953). Where
there is a partial liquidation in connection with a reorganization, the liquidation and
reorganization will be looked at as one transaction and all the expenses incurred
will be grouped as a capital expenditure. Mills Estate, Inc. v. Commissioner, 206
F. 2d 244 (2d Cir. 1953).
"' Kaufman v. Commissioner, 12 T. C. 1114 (1949).
Meldrum & Fewsmith, Inc. v. Commissioner, 20 T. C. No. 113 (1953).
' Commissioner v. Estate of Bartholomew, 4 T. C. 349, aff'd per curiun, 151
F. 2d 534 (9th Cir. 1945).
" Crawford v. Commissioner, 5 T. C. 91 (1945).
" Hochschild v. Commissioner, 161 F. 2d 817 (2d Cir. 1947).
2" Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co., et al. v. Commissioner, 21 B. T. A. 588 (1930).
2 Blum v. Commissioner, 11 T. C. 101, af'd, 183 F. 2d 281 (3d Cir. 1950).
'7 Salt v. Commissioner, 18 T. C. 182 (1952).
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tion or collection of income, or management, conservation, or mainte-
nance of property held for the production of income, it is deductible
unless it is (a) personal, 28 (b) capital, 29 or (c) contrary to public
policy.80
Legal expenses incurred in isolated personal transactions having
nothing to do with the taxpayer's business or non-business activities
are generally disallowed. Examples of such personal transactions in-
volving legal expenses are those incurred in defending against a suit
by a former wife to enforce a property settlement agreement growing
out of a divorce;31 preparing3 2 or contesting3 3 a will; settling a judg-
ment resulting from an automobile accident 34 (unless such accident oc-
curred with a vehicle being used in a business activity) ; contesting a
disputed election to establish the right to a public office ;85 obtaining a
release from military service;36 prosecuting a suit for slander ;7 and
contesting a suit for breach of promise.88
Legal fees expended in connection with divorce and separate main-
tenance are generally non-deductible personal and family expenses.
However, that portion of the fee which is properly attributable to the
production or collection of amounts includible in gross income as alimony
payments under Internal Revenue Code § 22(k) is deductible as a non-
business expense.3 9 In Baer v. Commissioner40 it was held that the part
of an attorney's fee which could be allocated to the services rendered in
connection with financial matters in controversy, as distinguished from
the divorce controversy, were deductible. Such services were held to
be directly related to the conservation and maintenance of property held
by the taxpayer for the production of income.
"INr. REv. CoDn § 24(a) (1).
"U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.24(a)-2 (1953).
'0 Stralla v. Commissioner, 9 T. C. 801 (1947).
" Jergens v. Commissioner, 17 T. C. 806 (1951) ; Howard v. Commissioner, 16
T. C. 157 (1951).
" Pennell v. Commissioner, 4 B. T. A. 1039 (1926).
" Hutchings v. Burnet, 58 F. 2d 514 (D. C. Cir. 1932).
Dickason v. Commissioner, 20 B. T. A. 496 (1930).
REV. RuL. 1, I. B. R. 1951-1.
Seese v. Commissioner, 7 T. C. 925 (1946).
'7 Legal fees are not deductible even though taxpayer's duties brought him into
contact with customers and the slander would affect his business. Lloyd v. Com-
missioner, 55 F. 2d 842 (7th Cir. 1932) ; Kleinschmidt v. Commissioner, 12 T. C.
921 (1949).
U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.24(a)-1 (1953).
"Commissioner v. Gale, 191 F. 2d 79 (2d Cir. 1951), affirming 13 T. C. 661;
LeMonde v. Commissioner, 13 T. C. 670 (1949) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.24(a)-
1 (1953).
" 196 F. 2d 646 (8th Cir. 1952). The basis for this decision seemed to be that
stock held by the taxpayer for production of income would have to be sold unless
some satisfactory settlement could be worked out. This settlement was accom-
plished by the lawyer. It has also been held that the fact that the taxpayer will
have to sell property held for the production of income will not allow deduction of
such attorney's fees. Hexter v. Commissioner, P-H 1945 TC MEM. DC. 44,399(1944).
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A ground frequently used for disallowance of a deduction for legal
expenses is that the charge is a capital one and should be added to the
tax base of property or should be amortized. Fees expended in de-
fending or perfecting title to property are capital in their nature and
must be added to the tax basis of the property.41 For example, a suit
to quiet title comes under this rule. Similarly, fees incurred as a result
of a lessee's contesting forfeiture of his lease are to clear the title and
are consequently capital.42  Fees in connection with foreclosing a lien
follow the same rule.43 Where title is in dispute and taxpayer pays a
claim solely to avoid unfavorable publicity, the legal fees incurred are
deductible, 44 but if there is any doubt, the general rule as to title de-
fense will apply.4 5 If the action to obtain the property in question is
unsuccessful, the fee incurred is a non-deductible personal expense.46
Where the title to property is in litigation along with income from
it, that part of the expenses allocable to such income is deductible while
the remainder is a capital expense.47  Similarly, the court in Helvering
v. Stormfeltz48 permitted a deduction of that part of a fee allocable to
the interest in an action to recover a money judgment from a guardian
for guardianship funds wrongfully appropriated. The remainder was a
capital expenditure analogous to that in title defense litigation. Several
other cases49 appear to be contra in that they have applied a major object
rule-that is where title was the major object of the litigation and the
income merely secondary, then the entire fee is held to be a capital ex-
pense. In an action for income fromr a trust, as distinguished from title
to the trust property, deduction was allowed.50
Attorney's fees incurred in connection with incorporation are capital
in nature and can be treated as a loss on dissolution of the corporation,5'
but where the corporation is chartered for a stipulated length of time,
such legal expenses !nay be amortized over the period the charter is to
run. 5 2  Expenses in connection with mergers, reorganizations and re-
,U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.24(a)-15 (1953).
J2 ohnson v. Commissioner, 162 F. 2d 844 (5th Cir. 1947).
"Shaw-Hayden Building Company v. Commissioner, 18 B. T. A. 949 (1930).
"Levitt & Sons, Inc. v. Nunan, 142 F. 2d 795 (2d Cir. 1944).
Levitt & Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 160 F. 2d 209 (2d Cir. 1947).
McClees v. Commissioner, P-H 1945 TC Mzm. DEc. 45,019 (1945).
Hochschild v. Commissioner, 7 T. C. 81, rev'd on other grounds, 161 F. 2d
817 (2d Cir. 1947) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23(a)-15 (1953).
,s Helvering v. Stormfeltz, 142 F. 2d 982 (8th Cir. 1944). A similar rule %vas
applied in Vincent v. Commissioner, 18 T. C. 339 (1952).
"' Safety Tube Corp. v. Commissioner, 168 F. 2d 787 (6th Cir. 1948). If the
property belongs to the plaintiff, then so does the income, and the title to both is
the object of the suit. Midco Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 20 T. C. No. 79 (1953).
"Tyler v. Commissioner, 6 T. C. 135 (1949).
" U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.24(a)-2 (1953) ; Shellabarger Grain Products Co.
v. Commissioner, 2 T. C. 75 (1943).
" Hershey Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 43 F. 2d 298 (10th Cir. 1930).
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capitalizations are likewise capital expenditures,5 3 but if the merger plans
are abandoned, the legal fees incurred may be deducted in the year of
abandonment.5 4
Expenses incurred in issuing bonds are capital, representing part of
the cost of borrowing money, and are deductible pro-rata over the life
of the bonds. 55 The same rule is applicable to expenses incurred in
securing mortgages and other loans. 6 Examples of other legal fees
which have been held to be capital expenses include those incurred in
defending the title to a patent 57 or copyright;58 defending the title to
stock held for the production of income ;59 obtaining a long term lease ;50
in connection with the construction of a building ;61 in the purchase by a
corporation of its own stock ;62 and in obtaining an abstract of, or a legal
opinion concerning title to real property.6 3
It should be noted that legal fees which are considered capital are
not necessarily lost as far as deductions for tax purposes are concerned,
but may be merely delayed deductions which can be taken later in the
form of deductions for depreciation, amortized expenses, or capital losses
when the capital asset is sold.
Prior to the Heininger case, all legal fees incurred in connection with
defending against a criminal charge on which the taxpayer was found
guilty were disallowed on grounds of public policy.0 4 Likewise, all such
expenses incurred in defending against an action for civil fraud were
denied deductibility.65 Since the Heininger decision, however, such de-
duction is not disallowed solely on the ground that it was contrary to
public policy where the taxpayer was found guilty, if a defense was made
in good faith. 66 Two recent decisions have indicated that legal expenses
incurred because of a wrongful act committed in a non-business activity
would also be deductible if such expenses were necessary to the produc-
53Skenandoa Rayon Corp. v. Commissioner, 122 F. 2d 268 (2d Cir. 1941).
Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co. v. Commissioner, 15 T. C. 106 (1950).
" Baltimore and Ohio R. R. v. Commissioner, 30 B. T. A. 194 (1934) ; W. P.
Brown & Sons Lumber Co. v. Commissioner '26 B. T. A. 1192 (1932).
Lovejoy v. Commissioner, 18 B. T. A. 1179 (1930).
Urquhart v. Commissioner, 20 T. C. No. 133 (1953).
U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.24(a)-2 (1953).
Bowers v. Lumpkin, 140 F. 2d 927 (4th Cir. 1944).
, Executor of Estate of Hilton v. Commissioner, 27 B. T. A. 57 (1932) ; David-
son v. Commissioner, 27 B. T. A. 158 (1932).
" Equitable Life Assurance Society of U. S. v. Commissioner, 44 B. T. A. 293,
aff'd, 137 F. 2d 293 (2d Cir. 1943).
.-Davenport v. Commissioner, P-H 1950 TC MEm. DEc. 1 50,035 (1950).
" Thompson v. Commissioner, 9 B. T. A. 1342 (1928).
Superior Wines and Liquors, Inc. v. Commissioner, 134 F. 2d 373 (8th Cir.
1943).
e Standard Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 129 F. 2d 363 (7th Cir. 1942).
G. C. M. 24,377, 1944 Cum. Bin.. 93, allowed deduction of fees incurred in
a defense against a charge of violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. G. C. M.
24,810, 1946-1 Cum. BUL. 55, allowed deduction of fees incurred in connection with
defending against a suit brought by the Price Administrator for violation of the
Emergency Price Control Act.
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tion of income or the management, conservation or maintenance, of
income producing property.6 7  Later decisions have indicated that the
expenses of defending a business which is per se illegal, as distinguished
from a legal business operated in an illegal manner, are not deductible,
and any holding to the contrary would frustrate public policy.68
LEwis F. CAMP, JR.
Mortgages-Agency-Power of Dealer to Bind Owner by Mortgage-
Indicia of Ownership-Automobile Title Certificates
There has been a practice among used-car dealers in purchasing
automobiles to receive title certificates with the assignment form on the
reverse side merely signed by the assignor-seller but blank as to the
assignee-car dealer. Later when the automobile is resold, the new
owner's name is entered in the blank as assignee; and there is an anony-
mous notarization of the original seller's signature. Thus, the transac-
tion is represented as one solely between the original seller and the new
owner, concealing the intermediate ownership of the used-car dealer in
direct contravention of the North Carolina Motor Vehicle Registration
Act.1
Since a sale of personal property is not required to be evidenced by
any written instrument in order to be valid, it has been held in North
Carolina that there may be a transfer of title to an automobile without
complying with the registration statute which requires a transfer and
delivery of a certificate of title.2 Therefore, it seems that a buyer may
get good title from a dealer who is an actual owner whether he holds an
incomplete title certificate or no certificate at all. The aforementioned
practice of receiving blank title certificates may, however, mislead third
parties where a dealer is not the actual owner but a limited agent.
Such was the situation in Hawkins v. M & I Finance Corp.8 In
this case the plaintiff, owner of an automobile, delivered his car and title
certificate, with the assignment form on the reverse side blank as to the
'7 Commissioner v. Josephs, 168 F. 2d 233 (8th Cir. 1948); Commissioner v.
Heide, 165 F. 2d 699 (2d Cir. 1948). These cases held that a casual trustee could
not deduct the expenses incurred in defending against a charge of breach of duty
as a trustee. It would be difficult to reconcile these cases with Bingham v. Com-
missioner, 325 U. S. 365 (1945).
"R Thomas v. Commissioner, 18 T. C. 1417 (1951); Stralla v. Commissioner,
9 T. C. 801 (1947).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-72 et seq. (1953).
2 Carolina Discount Corp. v. Landis Motor Co., 190 N. C. 157, 129 S. E. 414
(1925). In this case P had an unrecorded conditional sale on an automobile which
X sold "free of encumbrance" to D. X violated the Motor Vehicle Registration Act
by not endorsing and delivering the title certificate to D. The title certificate
showed the outstanding conditional sale. P claimed that title could not pass to D
without a compliance with the statute. Held: title passed to D. P should have
recorded his conditional sale in order to put D on notice of the encumbrance.
238 N. C. 174, 77 S. E. 2d 669 (1953).
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assignee but signed by the assignor-owner, to a used-car dealer for
resale. Instead the dealer exceeded his actual authority to sell and
mortgaged the car to the defendant finance company, which loaned
money on the car relying on the trade practice among car dealers as
showing that title had been transferred to the dealer by the transfer of
the certificate signed in blank. The owner was allowed to recover his
car from the mortgagee, the court holding that: (1) the dealer author-
ized merely to sell had no implied authority to mortgage the car; and
(2) the defendant-mortgagee could not rely on this trade practice and
the blank title certificate as indicating ownership in the dealer so as to
estop the real owner from claiming his title. On this latter point the
court said:
These practices may not be used as a basis for invoking the doc-
trine of estoppel. To permit such would be to legalize by indi-
rection this practice of suppressing notice of intermediate dealer
ownership as well as the companion practice of anonymous no-
tarization of transfer certificates, and thereby override the salutary
procedure fixed by statute for the prevention and suppression of
the very type of fraud and chicanery with which we are at grips
in the instant case. The public policy of this State as fixed by
these statutes may not be put to naught in such manner. The
principles of equity will not permit.4
When there is a sale or mortgage by a person not the owner, as in
the Hawkins case, the rights of the owner as against the buyer or mort-
gagee may depend on: (1) whether the person selling or mortgaging
is an agent of the owner;r or (2) whether such person may legally be
treated as an owner.6
In dealing with the person as an agent, one may rely on the implied
or apparent authority of the agent, i.e., that which the principal holds
his agent out to the world as having. It is elemental that no authority
to sell should be inferred from the mere possession of goods.7 Where,
'Id. at 184, 77 S. E. 2d at 677.
' Carter v. Rowley, 59 Cal. App. 486, 211 Pac. 267 (1922) ; Spooner v. Cum-
mings, 151 Mass. 313, 23 N. E. 839 (1890); Stockyards Nat. Bank of South
Omaha v. Harris Wool Co., 316 Mo. 426, 289 S. W. 623 (1926) ; Atlantic Discount
Corp. v. Young, 224 N. C. 89, 29 S. E. 2d 29 (1944); Southern Ry. v. W. A.
Simpkins Co., 178 N. C. 273, 100 S. E. 418 (1919) ; Mahar v. White, 190 Okla.
434, 124 P. 2d 260 (1942); Brown Bros. & Co. v. The William Clark Co., 22 R. I.
36, 46 AtI. 239 (1900) ; Zerr v. Howell, 84 S. W. 2d 867 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935);
Rogers v. Whitney, 91 Vt. 79, 99 Atl. 419 (1916).
'Rapp v. Fred W. Hauger Motors Co., 77 Cal. App. 417, 246 Pac. 1067 (1926);
Bailey v. Hoover, 233 Ky. 681, 26 S. W. 2d 522 (1930); Ruddy v. Oregon Auto.
Credit Corp., 179 Ore. 688, 174 P. 2d 603 (1946) ; Commercial Finance Corp. v.
Burke, 173 Ore. 341, 145 P. 2d 473 (1944) ; Scruggs v. Crockett Auto. Co., 41 S. W.
2d 509 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) ; Boice v. Finance Corp., 127 Va. 563, 102 S. E. 591
(1920).
'Pacific Accept. Corp. v. Bank of Italy, 59 Cal. App. 76, 209 Pac. 1024 (1922)
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however, in addition to possession by a limited agent, the owner has
given such evidence of authority to sell as usually accompanies such
authority according to the custom of trade, this is evidence, not that he
is the owner, but that he has received authority from the owner to sell.8
Illustrative of this latter situation is Carter v. Rowley,9 where an owner
left his automobile with a dealer to "find" a purchaser. Instead the
dealer sold to an innocent purchaser. There was evidence that: (1) the
owner had left his car in the possession of a dealer in secondhand cars;
(2) the dealer's premises were surrounded with conspicuous signs ad-
vertising used-cars for sale; and (3) the owner knew the dealer's line
of business. The court held that such circumstances, in addition to
possession, according to the custom of trade and general understanding
of businessmen indicated an authority in the dealer to consummate a
sale.
Once an authority to sell is established there arises the question what
other incidental authority exists by implication. Generally, the authority
to sell confers authority to fix any terms and conditions necessary to
the sale ;1O but it does not ordinarily include the power to -sell on credit,"
to exchange or barter, 12 or to pledge or mortgage.' 8  Consequently, in
situations such as that in the Hawkins case, courts seem reluctant to
extend protection, solely on the basis of an implied agency, to the mort-
gagee of a dealer with authority limited to selling. 14
Where a real owner has clothed an agent with indicia of title and
such title is relied on by an innocent purchaser, the purchaser may pre-
vail, not on the basis of the agent's apparent authority to represent any-
Overland Texarkana Co. v. Bickley, 152 La. 622, 94 So. 138 (1922) - Hawkins v.
M & J Finance Corp., 238 N. C. 174, 178, 77 S. E. 2d 669, 672 (1953) ; Handley
Motor Co., Inc. v. Wood, 237 N. C. 318, 323, 75 S. E. 2d 312, 316 (1953) ; American
Exchange Nat. Bank v. Winder, 198 N. C. 18, 21, 150 S. E. 489, 491 (1929);
Hedges v. Burke, 147 Tenn. 247, 247 S. W. 91 (1923).
s Carter v. Rowley, 59 Cal. App. 486, 211 Pac. 267 (1922) ; Atlantic Discount
Corp. v. Young, 224 N. C. 89, 29 S. E. 2d 29 (1944) ; Mahar v. White, 190 Okla.
434, 124 P. 2d 260 (1942).
959 Cal. App. 486, 211 Pac. 267 (1922).
"0 Powell v. King Lumber Co., 168 N. C. 632, 84 S. E. 1032 (1915); Daniel v.
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad, 136 N. C. 517, 48 S. E. 816 (1904); TIFFANY,
AGENCY § 32 (2nd ed. 1924).
"' Bowles v. Rice, 107 Va. 51, 57 S. E. 575 (1907) ; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 65
(1934).
"
2Davison v. Parks, 79 N. H. 262, 108 Atl. 288 (1919); MECHEM OUTLINES
OF AGENCY §§ 262-267 (3rd ed. 1923).
"'Pacific Finance Corp. v. Hendley, 119 Cal. App. 697, 7 P. 2d 391 (1932);
Moberg v. Commercial Credit Corp., 230 Minn. 469, 42 N. W. 2d 54 (1950); 2
WILLISTON, SALES §317 (Rev. ed. 1948).
1, Coolbaugh v. Atlantic Motor Finance Co., 101 N. J. L. 215, 128 Atl. 595
(1925); National Guarantee & Finance Co. v. Pfaff Motor Co., 124 Ohio 34, 176
N. E. 678 (1931). But cf. Bauer v. Commercial Credit Co., 163 Wash. 210, 300
Pac. 1049 (1931), where estoppel was applicable and a mortgagee prevailed against
an owner. 45 HARv. L. REv. 375 (1931).
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one, but on his apparent ownership. 15 In this situation the real owner
by his misleading actions is estopped to claim his title. That the real
owner thus clothes the agent means that the indicia of title must emanate
from the owner with his consent or knowledge as distinguished from
indicia feloniously created or obtained, as by forgery.'( The real owner
may be estopped to claim his title where he entrusts possession plus a
certain document-automobile title certificate17 or bill of sale.'"
Where an automobile title certificate is relied on as an indicium of
ownership, according to the Hawkins decision, it must be full and com-
plete on its face when received by a third party. North Carolina seems
to be in accord with the weight of authority which holds that an incom-
plete title certificate is not only insufficient indicium of ownership, but
is constructive notice of want of title. 19 But where a dealer is entrusted
with possession of an owner's automobile and certificate of title with
the assignment form on the reverse side blank as to the assignee but
signed by the assignor-owner, and the dealer completes the instrument
so there are no patent defects, it has been held that a third party may
rely on the certificate as indicium of title and treat the dealer as an
owner.
20
JOHN RANDOLPH INGRAM
Boice v. Finance & Guaranty Corp., 127 Va. 563, 102 S. E. 591 (1920). See
also, San Joaquin Valley Securities Co. v. Harris, 123 Cal. App. 774, 11 P. 2d 49
(1932), illustrating that as indicia of ownership must be coupled with possession,
so must possession be coupled with such indicia.
"Royle v. Worcester Buick Co., 243 Mass. 143, 137 N. E. 531 (1922). Where
the wrongdoer obtains the possession of the certificates of title, ownership, or regis-
tration, not by the voluntary act, or with the acquiescence or knowledge of the
owner, but by theft or forgery, considerations requiring the invocation of the doc-
trine of estoppel against the owner are lacking, since the evidences of ownership
having been secured by the felonious acts of the wrongdoer, the owner has done
nothing to mislead third persons purchasing the property from the wrongdoer on
the assumption of his ownership thereof.
'Washington Lumber & Millwork Co. v. McGuire, 213 Cal. 13, 1 P. 2d 437
(1931).
" Bailey v. Hoover, 233 Ky. 681, 26 S. W. 2d 522 (1930).
"A. C. Nelson Auto Sales, Inc. v. Turner, 241 Iowa 927, 44 N. W. 2d 36
(1950); Moberg v. Commercial Credit Corp., 230 Minn. 469, 42 N. W. 2d 54
(1950) ; Pearl v. Interstate Securities Co., 357 Mo. 160, 206 S. W. 2d 975 (1947) ;
Erwin v. Southwestern Investment Co., 147 Tex. 260, 215 S. W. 2d 330 (1948).
See, Wilson v. Commercial Finance Co., 239 N. C. 349, 358, 359, 71 S. E. 2d 908,
915, 916 (1954), where the court stated that under the law of Virginia an automobile
registration card would not constitute an indicium of title because the sole evidence
of the ownership of a motor vehicle is the certificate of title. The court also said
that ignoring the law of Virginia, in this case, the registration card would not be an
indicium of title since the notice of transfer form on the reverse side of the card
was blank and unsigned.
201 Commercial Finance Corp. v. Burke, 173 Ore. 341, 145 P. 2d 473 (1944).
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Motor Vehicles-Nolo Contendere-Suspension of Driver's License
Based Solely on the Record of Sentence on Such Plea Held Invalid
The question whether the record of a plea of nolo contenderel entered
in a drunken driving case will support a suspension of the operator's
license by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles pursuant to provisions
of G. S. 20-162 was recently presented to the Supreme Court for the
first time. In holding the Commissioner's action, taken solely upon the
record of the licensee's plea of nolo contendere, to be without authority
of law, the Court said that, the suspension proceedings before the Com-
missioner being separate from the proceedings in which the plea was
entered, the record was neither sufficient evidence of the offense nor the
equivalent of an admission that an offense had been committed.3
The plea of nolo contendere is of ancient origin 4 and has been recog-
nized by our Supreme Court since 1837.5 It authorizes judgment as
upon a verdict or plea of guilty,6 but leaves the defendant free to assert
his innocence in all other proceedings, both civil 7 and criminal,8 the
judgment and sentence upon the plea not being the equivalent of con-
viction or confession in open court.9 Other jurisdictions, confronted
with analogous situations, have relaxed this strict rule' ° and have drawn
two distinctions not expressly considered by the North Carolina Court:
(1) The issue involved in a proceeding of this nature is not the guilt or
innocence of the licensee but rather whether or not he has been con-
'Lat. I do not wish to contest (the action). 2 Bouvia's LAw DIcnoNARa
2354 (1914). For an excellent survey of the topic, see 30 N. C. L. REv. 407 (1952).
2 The statute gives the Commissioner "authority to suspend the license of any
operator . . . upon a showing by its records or other satisfactory evidence that the
licensee . . . has committed an offense for which mandatory revocation of license
is required upon conviction." N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16 (1953). Driving under
the influence of intoxicating liquor is such an offense.
2Winesett v. Scheidt, 239 N. C. 190, 79 S. E. 2d,501 (1954).
1 LAmUAXD, EIRFNARCHA: oR op The Office of the Justices of the Peace 511
(4th rev. 1599). This manual cites entries, relative to the plea, entered in 1407
and 1409.
'The earliest reported case appears to be State v. Oxendine, 19 N. C. 435(1837).State v. Cooper, 238 N. C. 241, 77 S. E. 2d 695 (1953) ; State v. Beasley, 226
N. C. 579, 39 S. E. 2d 607 (1946).71n re Stiers, 204 N. C. 48, 167 S. E. 382 (1933).
8 State v. Thomas, 236 N. C. 196, 72 S. E. 2d 525 (1952).
' State v. Oxendine, 19 N. C. 435 (1837). Also Winesett v. Scheidt, 239 N. C.
190, 79 S. E. 2d 501 (1954) ; State v. Thomas, 236 N. C. 196, 72 S. E. 2d 525;
in re Stiers, 204 N. C. 48, 167 S. E. 382 (1933).
1' Louisiana State Bar Association v. Steiner, 204 La. 1073, 16 So. 2d 843
(1944) ; Louisiana State Bar Association v. Connolly, 201 La. 342, 9 So. 2d 582
(1942); Wilson v. Burke, 356 Mo. 613, 202 S. W. 2d 876 (1946) ; Neibling et al.
v. Terry, 352 Mo. 396, 177 S. W. 2d 502 (1944) ; Kravis v. Hock, 136 N. J. L. 161.
54 A. 2d 778 (1947) ; Kravis v. Hock, 135 N. J. L. 259, 51 A. 2d 441 (Sup. Ct.
1947) ; Schireson v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 129 N. J. L. 203, 28 A. 2d
879 (Sup. Ct. 1942) ; State v. Estes, 130 Tex. S. Ct. Rep. 425, 109 S. W. 2d 167
(1939).
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victed;11 (2) where there is a statute which looks to conviction as a
basis for revoking or suspending a license without specifying how the
conviction shall be had, sentence upon the plea of nolo contendere may
be considered the equivalent of a conviction.1
2
The decision in the principal case is based upon an earlier North
Carolina decision.' 3 In that case, defendant, an attorney at law, had
pleaded nolo contendere to an indictment for embezzlement. Under the
statute then in force,14 disbarment proceedings predicated upon convic-
tion for a felony were instituted. The Court held that the fact that he
bad pleaded nolo contendere could not be used against him in such pro-
ceeding because the plea does not amount to a conviction in open court.
The principal case might have been distinguished on the ground that the
statute in the Stiers case, supra, required a conviction "in open court"
while G. S. 20-16 has no such requirement. However, no cases are
found supporting such a distinction.
The concurring opinion in the principal case suggests that the Com-
missioner proceed to revoke the operator's license under G. S. 20-17,
which tiirects that the Commissioner "forthwith revoke the license of
any operator ... upon receiving a record of such operator's . . .con-
viction" for drunken driving. This result is subject to the same objec-
tion, for the Commissioner would yet be revoking the license of a person
who has not been "convicted" within the meaning ascribed to the word
by the Court. One might even look askance at the clerk of court for
having sent the record in the first place, since the applicable statute,
G. S. 20-24(a), stipulates that the clerk forward to the Department of
Motor Vehicles all driver's licenses held by the person convicted, "to-
gether with a record of such conviction." Assuming, as did the Judge
in the concurring opinion, that this revocation would not be reviewable
under G. S. 20-25,'5 still the problem is not hurdled, for the licensee
might seek a writ of mandamus to force the return of his license, 10 or
seek a writ of certiorari to review the action taken.1
7
Two other possibilities present themselves. First, the trial court
might make surrender of the license a condition, agreed to by the li-
11 Kravis v. Hock, 136 N. J. L. 161, 165, 54 A. 2d 778, 781 (1947). Schireson v.
State Board of Medical Examiners, 129 N. 3. L. 203, 208, 28 A. 2d 879, 881 (Sup.
Ct. 1942).12 Neibling et al. v. Terry, 352 Mo. 396, 398, 177 S. W. 2d 502, 504 (1944).
13 In re Stiers, 204 N. C. 48, 167 S. E. 382 (1933).
"IN. C. CONSOL. STAT. 205 (1924) as amended by N. C. Pub. Laws 1929, c 64.
" "Any person denied a license or whose license has been cancelled, suspended,
or revoked by the Department, except where such cancellation is mandatory under
the provisions of this article, shall have a right to file a petition within thirty (30)
days thereafter for a hearing in the matter in the superior court." N. C. GaN. STAT.
§ 20-25 (1953).
'
0Hinnekens v. Magee, 135 N. J. L. 537, 53 A. 2d 356 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
"In re Wright, 228 N. C. 584, 46 S. E. 2d 696 (1948) ; Hinnekens v. Magee,
135 N. 3. L. 537, 53 A. 2d 356 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
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censee, upon which sentence could be suspended. This course, however,
poses an objection. Suppose that the licensee were subsquently found
guilty of operating a motor vehicle without a license. This would be
sufficient to result in execution of the suspended sentence. But suppose
instead that he had entered the plea of nolo contendere to the second
offense. In that event, our Court has held that the suspended sentence
received in the first case may not be executed on the strength of the
plea entered in the second, for proof of the violation must be made in-
dependent of the plea and independent of evidence or admission that
such a plea was made.' 8 Second, it is suggested that, the plea being one
which may be entered not as a matter of right but only by leave of court,
neither the court nor the prosecuting attorney need accept the proffered
plea. While these suggestions have their advantages if strictly applied,
neither solves but only seeks to avoid the basic problem presented.
In two states, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania,'9 the problem has
been solved by statutory enactments. The Pennsylvania statutes are par-
ticularly clear in effect. The section corresponding to G. S. 20-16 pro-
vides that:
The secretary may suspend the operating privileges of any person
... upon receiving a record of proceedings.., in which such per-
son pleaded guilty, entered a plea of nolo contendere, or was
found guilty by judge or jury, or whenever the secretary finds
upon sufficient evidence [that certain enumerated offenses have
been committed.]20
The section that corresponds to G. S. 20-17 states:
Upon receiving a certified record, from the clerk of court, of pro-
ceedings in which a person pleaded guilty, entered a plea of nolo
contendere, or was found guilty by a judge or jury, of any of the
crimes enumerated in this section, the secretary shall forthwith
revoke . . . the operating privilege of any such person.
2
'
While recognizing that the decision in the principal case is legally sound
and is inevitable in view of the Stiers precedent, it is submitted that the
great necessity for safety on our highways makes it desirable, even im-
perative, to revise the applicable statutes, bringing them into substantial
agreement with the Pennsylvania statutes quoted above.
MYRON C. BANKS
18 State v. Thomas, 236 N. C. 196, 72 S. E. 2d 525 (1952).
The Massachusetts statute applies only to mandatory revocation. MAss. ANN.
LAWs C. 90, § 24 (1946). The Pennsylvania Statutes, on the other hand, apply
both to mandatory and discretionary revocation. PURDON'S PENNA. STAT. ANNO.
C. 75, §§ 191, 192 (1953).
" PuRDoN's PENNA. STAT. ANNO. C. 75, § 192 (1953).
2" PuRnoN's PENNA. STAT. ANNO. C. 75, § 191 (1953).
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Municipal Corporations-Sunday Closing Ordinances-
Reasonableness of Classification
Defendant, operator of a curb market in the City of High Point, kept
his place of business open on Sunday, July 26, 1953, selling tomatoes,
peaches, and toilet paper. He was found guilty of violating an ordinance
of the City of High Point which made it unlawful for a place of business
to open on Sunday for selling or offering for sale goods, wares, mer-
chandise or services, but which excepted particular kinds of businesses
furnishing certain enumerated articles of merchandise.'
On appeal, defendant contended that the basis of classification in the
ordinance was arbitrary, unreasonable, and discriminatory in that the
businesses permitted to remain open on Sunday sold certain articles of
merchandise similar to those which he sold and were therefore his com-
petitors. The Supreme Court of North Carolina, in State v. Towery,2
held that defendant was in error in attempting to make competition
between classes the test, rather than discrimination within a class, and
that he had shown "no arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of the police
power in the classification and selection of businesses to be closed on
Sunday."'
The ordinance challenged in the Towery case is a common type of
Sunday closing ordinance, containing a provision stating generally that
all businesses will close on Sunday, with a second provision exempting
certain types of businesses from the operation of the first. A necessary
element of ordinances of this type is the classification of businesses, and
such ordinances have been attacked as unconstitutional on the ground
that the classification applied was arbitrary and unreasonable, or that
it was discriminatory. 4  To be a valid classification, all those similarly
I Section 17.32 of The Code of the City of High Point, as amended June 17,
1952, which reads in part: "It shall be unlawful for any place of business to remain
open for the purpose of selling or offering for sale goods, wares, merchandise or
services between the hours of midnight Saturday and midnight Sunday, except as
follows: hotels; boarding houses; restaurants; cafes, delicatessen and sandwich
shops furnishing meals and selling bread, cooked or prepared meats incidental to
the operation of such business; filling stations furnishing petroleum products and
automobile accessories; garages furnishing repair work or storage; ice cream or
confectionary stores, furnishing ice cream, cigars, tobacco, nuts and soft drinks
only; cigar stands and newsstands furnishing cigars, tobacco, candies, nuts, news-
papers, magazines and soft drinks only; drug stores furnishing medical or surgical
supplies, cigars, tobacco, ice cream, candies, nuts, soft drinks, newspapers and
magazines; ice dealers, for the manufacture and sale of ice; dairies, for the manu-
facture and sale of dairy products; bakeries, for the manufacture, sale and delivery
of bakery products. . . ." Quoted in State v. Towery, 239 N. C. 274, 275, 79 S. E.
2d 513, 514 (1954).
2239 N. C. 274, 79 S. E. 2d 513 (1954).
Id. at 278, 79 S. E. 2d at 516.
'In addition to this type of Sunday closing ordinance, two other types have
been challenged on the ground of arbitrary and unreasonable classification: (1)
Where there is a general provision that all businesses must close on Sunday and a
second provision exempting the sale of certain articles from the operation of the
first; (2) Where there is no general closing provision and the ordinance requires
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situated must receive equal treatment, and the classification must not
be arbitrary or unreasonable.5 It is not necessary, however, that it be
made with "abstract symmetry" or with "mathematical nicety." 6 Classi-
fication in Sunday ordinances will generally be upheld if it rests upon
any reasonable basis, and if it has any reasonable relation to the public
health, morals, safety, or general welfare.7
Ordinances requiring businesses in general to close on Sunday, but
exempting certain enumerated kinds of businesses, have generally been
held to be reasonable and not arbitrary, 8 and a reasonable basis for a
distinction between businesses is usually found.9 In State v. Medlin,'0
an ordinance exempting drug stores for the sale of drugs all day on
Sunday, and 'during certain specified hours on Sunday for the sale of
"mineral waters, soft drinks, cigars and tobacco only," was held by the
North Carolina court to be reasonable on the ground that since drug
stores were open for the sale of drugs and medicines all day on Sunday,
as a matter of necessity, they could be permitted to sell, during the speci-
fied hours, articles of common use which are to many persons "quasi-
necessities."'" Some courts have held, however, that such distinctions
only a particular type of business to close. See Broadbent v. Gibson, 105 Utah 53,
140 P. 2d 939 (1943).
City of Springfield v. Smith, 332 Mo. 1129, 19 S. W. 2d 1 (1929) ; State v.
Trantham, 230 N. C. 641, 55 S. E. 2d 198 (1949); 6 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL
COR'RATIOS § 24.192 (3rd ed., 1949).
People v. Friedman, 302 N. Y. 75, 96 N. E. 2d 184 (1950).
State v. McGee, 237 N. C. 633, 75 S. E. 2d 783 (1953).
"Lane v. McFadyen, - Ala. _ 66 So. 2d 83 (1953) ; Richman v. Board of
Commissioners of City of Newark, 122 N. J. L. 180, 4 A. 2d 501 (1939) ; People
v. Friedman, 302 N. Y. 75, 96 N. E. 2d 184 (1950) ; State v. Sopher, 25 Utah 318,
71 Pac. 482 (1903) ; State v. Nichols, 28 Wash. 628, 69 Pac. 372 (1902).
I In Ex parte Sumida, 177 Cal. 388, 170 Pac. 823 (1918), an ordinance requir-
ing businesses to close on Sunday, excepting (among others) bakeries, livery
stables, drug stores, confectioneries, ice cream parlors and garages, was held not
to be discriminatory, since in the case of the businesses excepted it was the cus-
tom to keep them open, as well as to some extent necessary to do so, since persons
might need something from these businesses which they could not prepare for on
Saturday nor wait for until Monday.
In Lane v. McFadyen, - Ala. -, -, 66 So. 2d 83, 88 (1953), a statute
prohibiting a "merchant or shopkeeper" from keeping open on Sunday, druggists
excepted, was found to be a reasonable classification and not clearly arbitrary, the
court stating that "in order to have a place where drugs might be obtained on
Sunday, a bona fide druggist should be permitted to dispose of those articles usually
and customarily sold in drug stores other than drugs." For discussion of this
statute, see Comment, 5 ALA. L. Rzv. 349 (1953).10 170 N. C. 682, 86 S. E. 597 (1915).
'I It was further stated that it is not unreasonable to forbid other businesses
to open even during the specified hours on the ground that "people might there con-
gregate to the public scandal and to the dissatisfaction of the public, who expect a
decent, reasonable observance of Sunday." State v. Medlin, 170 N. C. 682, 684,
86 S. E. 597, 598 (1915).
A reasonable basis has generally been found for ordinances singling out a par-
ticular class of business and prohibiting its operation on Sunday. People v. Krotkie-
wicz, 286 Mich. 644, 282 N. W. 852 (1938) (sale and distribution of groceries) ;
Komen v. City of St. Louis, 316 Mo. 9, 289 S. W. 838 (1926) (bakeries) ; State v.
Loomis, 75 Mont. 88, 242 Pac. 344 (1925) (dance halls) ; Mazzarelli v. City of
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between businesses are arbitrary and unreasonable and not a valid exer-
cise of the police power.12  There must be a valid and substantial rea-
son for the law to operate only upon certain classes rather than upon
all, and it is not sufficient simply because all within a certain class are
affected in the same way. 13
Where classification in a Sunday ordinance permits a business to
remain open on Sunday and sell articles of merchandise similar to those
sold by a business prohibited from opening, is the ordinance discrimina-
tory and unconstitutional? The more recent cases have generally found
such ordinances to be arbitrary and unreasonable. 14  Such businesses
are in competition with each other, are similarly situated with respect
to the subject matter of the ordinance, and it is declared to be unrea-
sonable and arbitrary to allow sales by an exempted business and deny
that privilege to a business required to close.1r Where such ordinances
have been upheld, the courts reason that as long as all of one class are
affected equally under the ordinance, it is reasonable and not arbitrary.1"
Elizabeth, 11 N. J. Misc. Rep. 150, 164 AtI. 898 (Sup. Ct. 1933) (butcher shop) ;
Ex parte Johnson, 77 Okla. Crim. 360, 141 P. 2d 599 (1943) (barber shop). For
citation of cases sustaining similar ordinances and also cases holding them invalid,
see 6 McQuiLLIx, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24.197 (3rd ed., 1949).
" Henderson v. Antonacci, 62 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1952) (no reason why the health,
morals, or general welfare would be better safeguarded by requiring used car
dealers to close than by allowing them to operate along with proprietors of tourist
attractions) ; City of Mt. Vernon v. Julian, 369 I1. 447, 17 N. E. 2d 52 (1938)
(no reason why the public welfare was served by closing a grocery store while a
confectionery store remained open).
" Henderson v. Antonacci, 62 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1952).
In Elliott v. State, 29 Ariz. 389, 242 Pac. 340 (1926), a closing ordinance was
held to grant special privileges and immunities to certain classes of citizens while
denying them to others without legal excuse, the court stating that it is not legiti-
mate discrimination to close groceries, shoe stores, and hardware stores, while
allowing jewelers, dealers in second-hand goods and tailoring establisbments to
open without restriction.
"'Deese v. City of Lodi, 21 Cal. App. 2d 631, 69 P. 2d 1005 (1937) ; Allen v.
City of Colorado Springs, 101 Colo. 498, 75 P. 2d 141 (1937) ; City of Mt. Vernon
v. Julian, 369 Ill. 447, 17 N. E. 2d 52 (1938) ; Arrigo v. City of Lincoln, 154 Neb.
537, 48 N. W. 2d 643 (1951) ; Broadbent v. Gibson, 105 Utah 53, 140 P. 2d 939
(1943).1 Arrigo v. City of Lincoln, 154 Neb. 537, 48 N. W. 2d 643 (1951). There an
ordinance requiring grocery stores and meat markets to close on Sunday, excepting,
among other businesses, drug stores, cigar stores, ice cream parlors, and fruit stores,
and providing that they should not sell groceries or articles ordinarily sold from
a grocery store except fresh fruits, ice, bread and milk, 'was held invalid to the
extent that it required grocery stores to close on Sunday, excluded them from
exceptions permitting similar businesses to be open for necessary purposes, and
barred them from the sale of fruits, ice, bread and milk.
A statute discriminates between persons similarly situated, which permits con-
fectionery stores to open on Sunday and sell soft drinks and confections while
grocery stores selling the same items have to close. Broadbent v. Gibson, 105
Utah 53, 140 P. 2d 939 (1943).
There is no basis for the discrimination by an ordinance under which a drug
store can sell staple groceries on Sunday, while the operator of a grocery store
is prohibited from selling the same items. Allen v. City of Colorado Springs, 101
Colo. 498, 75 P. 2d 141 (1937).
16 State v. Nicholls, 77 Ore. 415, 151 Pac. 473 (1915) (defendant contended
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In the prior North Carolina case of State v. TranthamY' the court
indicated that a Sunday ordinance might be unreasonably discriminatory
if under it there was competition between a permitted and a prohibited
business in the same articles of merchandise, the permitted business
being allowed to sell them on Sunday. The court there stated, in hold-
ing that defendant could not challenge the constitutionality of an ordi-
nance' 8 similar to the one in the Towery case, that it was not made to
appear that defendant kept in stock for sale one of the enumerated
salable articles,19 and that no competitor of his had been accorded a
privilege which was denied to him. Only where there is discrimination
between those of a particular group or class who are similarly situated
with reference to the subject matter of the legislation is the ordinance
unconstitutional .
20
Under the Towery case, however, classification is declared not dis-
criminatory although articles of merchandise permitted to be sold on
Sunday by an exempted business are also sold by a business prohibited
from opening on Sunday.2 1 The court relies on State v. Medlin, where
that his cigar store, selling cigars and candy, had to close on Sunday while under
the same statute a drug storemight open and sell the same items; yet the statute
was held reasonable since it applied to all persons coming within the prohibited
class, and the businesses excepted "minister to wants more imperative") ; Richman
v. Board of Commissioners of City of Newark, 122 N. J. L. 180, 4 A. 2d 501 (1939)
(ordinance was attacked as discriminatory and unreasonable in prohibiting the
opening of grocery stores and not affecting other merchants, many of whom sold
foodstuffs not classified as groceries, but was found valid since it was general and
applied to all grocery stores in the city without exception) ; State v. Cranston, 59
Idaho 561, 85 P. 2d 682 (1938) (statute limiting exemptions to places prinmarily
established for the sale of certain necessaries or where the articles are made or
produced is not unjust discrimination, since it is not necessary to exempt all busi-
nesses where such articles night be sold).11230 N. C. 641, 55 S. E. 2d 198 (1949).
IS The ordinance had a general closing provision with a proviso that it did not
apply to "garages and filling stations, drug stores, cigar stores, confectionery stores,
shops, stands and bakeries which shall be allowed to operate on Sunday for the
sale of gas and oil, drugs, medicines, druggist sundries, cigars, tobacco, fruits, ice,
ice cream, confections, nuts, soda and mineral waters, bread, pies, cakes, news-
papers, periodicals, and for no other purpose." Section 199 of the Code of the City
of Asheville, as quoted in State v. Trantham, 230 N. C. 641, 642, 55 S. E. 2d 198,
199 (1949).IS The defendant had sold groceries on Sunday.
"0 State v. Trantham, 230 N. C. 641, 55 S. E. 2d 198 (1949). Cf. State v. McGee,
-237 N. C. 633, 75 S. E. 2d 783 (1953), where the defendant, operator of a motion
picture theater, challenged the validity of a city ordinance permitting theaters
charging a fee to operate only during specified hours on Sunday, on the ground it
discriminated against him in that it permitted radio and television stations to
operate while he was required to be closed. The court, after stating that defendant
did not claim the ordinance discriminated against him insofar as it applied to per-
sons similarly situated and engaged in the theater business, held that the motion
picture theater was an entirely different business from a radio or television station,
and further, that no fee was charged to listen to the radio or watch a television show.
"1 It would seem there is room for argument as to whether a grocery store
should be in a different class from a drug store, in regard to articles of merchan-
dise which they both ordinarily sell. Could it not be argued that the two busi-
nesses are similarly situated with regard to those articles?
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the ordinance construed excepted drug stores for the sale of "drugs,
medicines, mineral waters, soft drinks, cigars and tobacco only," but the
ordinance in the principal case excepted drug stores furnishing enu-
merated items, not expressly limiting them to sales of such items only.
Whether a drug store could sell staple groceries on Sunday under the
ordinance the court does not decide, and it is open to question whether
the court would hold an ordinance discriminatory under such circum-
stances.
Ordinances such as the one considered in the Towery case seem to
place more significance upon the name of the business than upon what
business it in fact does. Where an ordinance excepts drug stores from
its operation, for instance, should a store still be considered a drug store
although its primary business consists of the sale of articles other than
drugs and medicines? It has been stated that at the present time "a
'drug store' could mean anything from a place where 'drugs alone are
sold to one where anything from an aspirin tablet to an automobile could
be purchased.22  It is submitted that the better Sunday closing ordi-
nance is one with a general closing provision and which does not except
particular kinds of businesses from its operation, but rather excepts only
enumerated articles or items which can be sold on Sunday.
23
CALVIN C. WALLACE
Negotiable Instruments-Defenses of Lack and Failure of
Consideration as Affected by Seal
In an action on promissory notes under seal, it was held that if the
'defendant could show a total failure of consideration, this would be a
good defense, since the presumption of consideration arising from the
seal is rebuttable.'
The origin of the seal is traceable to times when few people could
write, and accordingly identified themselves by the use of a distinctive
2' See Henderson v. Antonacci, 62 So. 2d 5, 10 (Fla. 1952) (concurring opinion).
23 Statutes with this type of classification have generally been upheld. State v.
Justus, 91 Minn. 447, 98 N. W. 325 (1904) ; State v. Diamond, 56 N. D. 854, 219
N. W. 831 (1928) ; People v. Zimmerman, 48 Misc. Rep. 203, 95 N. Y. Supp. 136
(Sup. Ct. 1904).
Under such a statute, it has been said that where tobacco and candy are excepted
from its operation, a large department store could open for the sale of those items,
although there is doubt whether it would be economically feasible for them to do
so. State v. Grabinski, 33 Wash. 2d 603, 206 P. 2d 1022 (1949).
Such an ordinance has been held arbitrary in permitting the sale of a can of
beer on Sunday, while prohibiting the sale of a can of orange juice or coffee.
Gronlund v. Salt Lake City, 113 Utah 284, 194 P. 2d 464 (1948).
" Mills v. Bonin, 239 N. C. 498 (1954). The distinction between want and failure
of consideration should be noted. "Want of consideration embraces transactions
or instances where none was intended to pass, while failure of consideration im-
plies that a valuable consideration, moving from obligee to obligor, was contem-
plated." In re Killeen's Estate, 310 Pa. 182, 187, 165 At. 34, 35 (1932).
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personal seal. This use of the seal as a means of identification antedated
the contract theory of consideration, and when that doctrine arose, the
exception of sealed instruments from its application became a part of
the substantive law.2
A clear statement of this exception was made in Walker v. Walker,'
where in an action on a sealed promissory note, the court stated that it
is "not aware of any rule of law by which a consideration is inferred from
the fact of the execution of a sealed instrument. No consideration is
necessary in order to give validity to a deed." 4 The presence or absence
of consideration apparently could not be inquired into, as none was
necessary;5 therefore, lack of consideration would be no defense to an
action on the note.
In several 'decisions subsequent to the Walker case the North Caro-
lina court states that "a note under seal imports a consideration," which
might mean that the seal only creates a rebuttable presumption, so that
lack of consideration, once proved, would be a defense to an action on
a sealed note." Regardless of what language it may use, however, the
court has uniformly reached the result that lack of consideration is no
'defense to liability on a note under seal. It would seem that this result
is against the weight of authority, which recognizes that the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law makes lack of consideration a defense
against anyone not a holder in due course in these cases.7  North Caro-
2 BLACKSTONE, COmmENTARIES 493 (Gavit ed. 1892); HoLmEs, THE CoMMoN
LAW 273 (1881).
335 N. C. 335 (1852).
4 Id. at 336.
'Ducker v. Whitson, 112 N. C. 44, 16 S. E. 854 (1893) (notes were intended as
a gift).Angier v. Howard, 94 N. C. 27, 29 (1886). Similar language is used in Cowen
v. Williams, 197 N. C. 432, 149 S. E. 396 (1929); Moose v. Crowell, 147 N. C.
551, 61 S. E. 524 (1908) ; Ducker v. Whitson, 112 N. C. 44, 16 S. E. 854 (1893).
In Webster v. Bailey, 118 N. C. 193, 194, 24 S. E. 9, 10 (1896), the court states
that "the law conclusively presumes that it was made upon good and sufficient con-
sideration' Burriss v. Starr, 165 N. C. 657, 81 S. E. 929 (1914), quotes the accu-
rate language of Walker v. Walker, 35 N. C. 335 (1852), and Harrell v. Watson,
63 N. C. 454 (1869), uses language similar to that in the Walker case. See 1
CoBIN, CONTRACrS § 252 (1950).
7 St. Paul's Episcopal Church v. Fields, 81 Conn. 870, 72 Atl. 145 (1909)
Italo-Petroleum Corp. of America v. Hannigan, 1 Ter. 500, 14 A. 2d 401 (Del.
1940) ; Citizens' Bank of Blakely v. Hall, 179 Ga. 662, 177 S. E. 496 (1934) ; Citi-
zens' Nat. Bank v. Custis, 153 Md. 235, 138 Att. 261 (1927) (all decided under the
NIL). Contra: Shinn et al. v. Stemler, 150 Pa. Super. 350, 45 A. 2d 242 (1946)(want of consideration is no defense, although failure of consideration is; case
decided in absence of NIL).
Lack of consideration would appear to be a valid defense, however, if the action
is brought in equity. The court in Woodall v. Prevatt, 45 N. C. 199, 201 (1853),
said that "while in law a seal imports a valuable consideration which is conclusive,
in equity a seal only raises a presumption of a valuable consideration which may be
rebutted." See Thomason v. Bescher, 176 N. C. 622, 97 S. E. 654 (1918). And
Dean Roscoe Pound has written, "although courts of equity are accustomed to say
they will not aid a volunteer, and will not give specific performance of a contract
under seal where there is no common law consideration, they enforce options under
seal." Pound, Consideration it; Equity, 13 ILL. L. Rav. 667, 676 (1918).
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lina cases fail to refer to the NIL in this situation and apparently treats
those cases decided before its enactment in 1899 no differently from those
decided afterward.8
The principal case concerns failure of consideration, and apparently
the rule relied upon was first announced in Farrington v. McNeill.0
Without discussion or citation of authority, the court in that case simply
concluded its opinion by stating that "it is true, the note in this case is
under seal, which purports a consideration, but such presumption is
rebuttable as between the parties thereto.""' Where the Farrington case
has been cited by our court for this rule, it has always been in a case
treated as one involving a failure of consideration, and not lack of con-
sideration; but the statement of the rule is not so limited on its face.11
Yet it is doubtful whether the rule could have any reasonable application
except to a lack of consideration, for since the use of a seal "imports" a
consideration at the inception of the agreement, it could hardly have any
bearing on the issue of whether consideration actually bargained for
$The basis for the rule in other jurisdictions is NIL § 6(4),vhich provides
that "the validity and negotiable character of an instrument are not affected by the
fact that . . . [it] bears a seal." N. C. Gr.. STAT. § 25-12 (1953). This, the
courts say, makes the sealed note a negotiable instrument within the NIL, and
therefore subject to NIL § 24, which provides that "every negotiable instrument is
deemed prima facie to hare been issued for a valuable consideration," N. C. GEN.
STAT. § 25-29 (1953), and also to NIL § 28, which provides that "absence or failure
of consideration is a matter of defense as against any person not a holder in due
course." N. C. GEN. STAT. § 25-33 (1953). See Citizens' Nat. Bank v. Custis, 153
Md. 235, 239, 138 Atl. 261, 263 (1927), where it is stated that the instrument is
negotiable paper under the uniform act, and "by statutory conversion loses its posi-
tion and quality as a specialty to the extent of both its negotiable characteristics
and of its validity or legal sufficiency as a negotiable instrument."
North Carolina has always declared that a sealed note could be negotiated,
Marsh v. Brooks, 33 N. C. 409 (1850), and therefore would seemingly need not
employ N. C. GEN. STAT. § 25-12 (1953) to declare that a sealed note is negotiable;
while in many other jurisdictions, before the NIL, a sealed note was a specialty
(called a 'bill single'), which was non-negotiable. Ex parte First Nat. Bank of
Ozark, 212 Ala. 274, 102 So. 371 (1924) ; Brown v. Jordahl, 32 Minn. 135, 19 N. W.
650 (1884) ; McLaughlin v. Braddy, 63 S. C. 433, 41 S. E. 523 (1901).
In Perry v. First Citizens National Bank & Trust Co., 226 N. C. 667, 40 S. E.
2d 116 (1946), the court cited N. C. GEN. STAT. § 25-33 (1953) in support of its
holding that a failure of consideration is a valid defense to a note under seal. The
same result apparently could be reached in cases involving a lack of consideration.
9 174 N. C. 420, 93 S. E. 957 0(1917).
10 Id. at 422, 93 S. E. at 958. Compare this with the language quoted earlier
from Walker v. Walker, 35 N. C. 335 (1852), where the court said consideration
was not necessary to a sealed instrument.
" Patterson v. Fuller, 203 N. C. 788, 167 S. E. 74 (1932). An ideal situation
was presented here for the exact definition of our status regarding lack or failure
of consideration as a defense, as the defendant attempted to construe Burriss v.
Starr, 165 N. C. 651, 81 S. E. 929 (1914), a case involving a lack of consideration,
so as to include a failure of consideration. The court left the situation still in doubt.
Royster v. Hancock, 235 N. C. 110, 69 S. E. 2d 29 (1951) ; Perry v. First Citizens
National Bank & Trust Co., 226 N. C. 667, 40 S. E. 2d 116 (1946) ; Lentz v. John-
son & Sons, Inc., 207 N. C. 614, 178 S. E. 226 (1934).
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has subsequently failed.'2 However this may be, the rule that failure of
consideration is a defense to an action on a sealed promissory note is in
accord with the weight of authority.'3
Although in the Farrington case it was expressly stated that a failure
of consideration was involved, in many cases the court does not state
clearly whether the problem in the particular case involves a lack or a
failure of consideration; and in no case is there any discussion of the
distinction between the two. Since lack of consideration is no defense,
while failure of consideration may be shown in an action on a sealed
note in this jurisdiction, it is felt that an express statement as to which
is being dealt with is needed in each instance. Especially in Lentz v.
Johnson & Sons, Jnc,14 is it questionable whether the court recognized
the difference between a lack and a failure of consideration. There the
plaintiff held notes made by the defendant's brother, and at the plaintiff's
request, so as to make" the situation appear better to the bank examiners,
the defendant signed his name to the notes. It would seem that the
parties never intended any consideration to be present, and therefore a
lack of consideration would be involved, but the court nevertheless ap-
plied its rule as to failure of consideration without any discussion as to
which was present.
Although most of the other jurisdictions deal with sealed promissory
notes under the provisions of the NIL, and consequently treat them
separately from general contracts under seal, 15 there seems to be no
distinction made between the treatment of notes under seal and con-
tracts under seal in this jurisdiction.16 And just as in the case of a note
1 Williston, speaking of contracts under seal, points out that a sharp distinction
must be made between a lack and a failure of consideration since a failure of con-
sideration is a defense to an action on the contract. 1 WiLsasToN, CoNTRAcTs § 109
(Rev. ed., 1936). It seems this would be equally true of a note under seal.
"3 Citizens' Bank of Blakely v. Hall, 179 Ga. 662, 177 S. E. 496 (1934) ; Citi-
zens' Nat. Bank v. Custis, 153 Md. 235, 138 Atl. 261 (1927) (both decided under
the NIL). Shinn et al. v. Stemler, 150 Pa. Super. 350, 45 A. 2d 242 (1946) (de-
cided in absence of NIL). Although several North Carolina cases involving a
failure of consideration cite N. C. GEN. STAT. § 25-33 (1953), see note 8, supra,
apparently little reliance is placed thereon.
"207 N. C. 614, 178 S. E. 226 (1934).
'
5 Ex parte First Nat. Bank of Ozark, 212 Ala. 274, 102 So. 371 (1924). The
court there points out that a sealed note at one time was a specialty, and even when
a state statute provided that the consideration of a sealed instrument could be
attacked, it had no application to sealed notes. It was not until the NIL was
enacted that a sealed note was relieved of the effect of its seal. But see BLACr-
STONE, COMMENTAmS 493 (Gavit ed. 1892), where it is stated that a note "is little
more than an ordinary contract" between the original parties.
18 Apparently notes under seal and contracts under seal are treated interchange-
ably. In Coleman v. Whisnant, 226 N. C. 258, 37 S. E. 2d 693 (1946), the action
was on a contract under seal, and to support its decision that consideration was not
necessary, the court relied upon Harrell v. Watson, 63 N. C. 454 (1869), which in-
volved a bond ( a note under seal), and the Harrell case was in turn aided in its
determination by the fact that a deed needs no consideration. Thomason v. Bescher,
176 N. C. 622, 97 S. E. 654 (1918), dealt with an option, but quoted from the
Harrell case.
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under seal, it appears that lack of consideration is not available as a
defense to a contract under seal. 17  This also remains the view, as re-
gards contracts, in those jurisdictions which have not yet changed by
statute the effect of the seal.' 8
Apparently North Carolina has no cases involving a failure of con-
sideration in the case of a general contract under seal, although the same
criticism made previously with respect to sealed notes is valid here also-
namely, that the court does not indicate that it is aware of the distinction
between a lack and a failure of consideration in these cases involving
sealed instruments. In two cases'9 there were recitals of mutual promises
in the contracts involved, which it seems would involve a failure of
consideration. Nevertheless, the court apparently considered only the
issue of lack of consideration, as it was stated that under "the common
law, which still obtains in this jurisdiction, instruments under seal are
generally held to be good as against a plea by one of the parties of no
consideration, because the seal imports consideration or renders it un-
necessary.' 20  As regards other jurisdictions in the matter of failure of
consideration of a contract, Professor Williston, writing on sealed in-
struments, states that "at the present time there is no doubt that failure
of consideration would everywhere be held a defense."'2 1
In view of the desirability of having a rule that is as -definite in state-
ment and as simple of application as a rule can be, perhaps by applying
our statutes on negotiable instruments to notes under seal we could at
least enjoy the convenience of having only one rule to apply, whether a
lack or a failure of consideration was involved.2 2 We could thereby do
away as well with the burden of having first to decide whether the case
concerns a lack or a failure of consideration. And as for general con-
tracts under seal, perhaps it would not be unwise to join the majority of
states which have already enacted legislation abolishing the distinction
between sealed and unsealed instruments.
23
DONALD R. ERB
17 Crotts v. Thomas, 226 N. C. 385, 38 S. E. 2d 158 (1946) ; Samonds v. Clon-
inger, 189 N. C. 610, 127 S. E. 706 (1925) ; Thomason v. Bescher, 176 N. C. 622,
97 S. E. 654 (1918).8 Wagner v. McClay, 306 Ill. App. 560, 138 N. E. 164 (1923) ; Zirk v. Nohr,
127 N. J. Law 217, 21 A. 2d 766 (1941) ; Poelcher v. Poelcher, 366 Pa. 3, 76 A. 2d
222 (1950) ; Bandy v. Bandy, 187 S. C. 410, 197 S. E. 396 (1938). See RESTATE-
mENT, CoNTRAcrs § 110 (1932); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRAcrS § 217 (Rev. ed. 1936).
10 Coleman v. Whisnant, 226 N. C. 258, 37 S. E. 2d 693 (1946); Basketeria
Stores, Inc. v. Public Indemnity Company, 204 N. C. 537, 168 S. E. 822 (1933).
20 Coleman v. Whisnant, 226 N. C. 258, 260, 37 S. E. 2d 693, 694 (1946).
211 WILLISrON, CONTRAcTS § 109 (Rev. ed. 1936). But see Harvey v. Ryan,
59 W. Va. 134, 53 S. E. 7 (1906), pointing out that failure of consideration is no
defense at common law, but is made so today by statute. Contra: Goodwin v.
Cabot Amusement Co., 129 Me. 36, 149 Atl. 574 (1930), where it is said the de-
fense of failure of consideration is no more potent than that of want of consideration.
2 See statutes and cases cited note 8 supra.
221 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTs § 218 (Rev. ed. 1936).
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Taxation-Federal Estate Taxation-Retention of Power to
Terminate Trusts
Since the decision in Commissioner v. Estate of Holmes' the law has
been settled that the retention by the settlor of a trust of the power to
terminate that trust is such a power as contemplated by Section 811(d)
of the Internal Revenue Code,2 if there are contingent beneficiaries under
the trust. Therefore, where the power to terminate is retained it will be
subject to the estate tax. The Court in Holmes stated:
It seems obvious that one who has the power to terminate contin-
gencies upon which the right of enjoyment is staked, so as to make
certain that a beneficiary will have it who may never come into it
if the power is not exercised, has power which affects not only the
time of enjoyment but also the person or persons who may enjoy
the donation. More therefore is involved than mere acceleration.3
To the taxpayer's contention that the interests were vested, the Court
said, "... 'enjoyment' and 'enjoy,' as used in these and similar statutes,
are not terms of art but connote substantial present economic benefit
rather than technical vesting of title or estates."'4
The question then arose, what effect does Section 811(d) have on a
power to terminate where there is a beneficiary or are beneficiaries who
have the equitable fee in trust, and where there are no contingent inter-
ests involved? The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Hay's
2 Commissioner v. Estate of Holmes, 326 U. S. 480 (1936). In this case the
decedent had created trusts for the benefit of his sons. They were to continue for
fifteen years, unless sooner terminated by the decedent. The decedent, as trustee,
was authorized in his discretion either to distribute or to accumulate the income.
On the death of any beneficiary his share was to go to his surviving issue, or if
none, to his surviving brothers or their issue, or if deceased, to the decedent's wife.
The Supreme Court held the value of the trust to be includible in the decedent's
gross estate as an interest whereof the "enjoyment" was subject at the date of his
death to change through the exercise of a power to "alter, amend, or revoke."
- INT. REV. CODa 811 (d) provides in substance that "the value of the gross estate
of the decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death
of all property . . . to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has
at any time made a transfer . . . where the enjoyment thereof was subject at the
date of his death to change through the exercise of a power . .. by the decedent
alone or by the decedent in conjunction with any other person . . . to alter, amend,
revoke, or terminate. . . ." Section 811(d) is composed of two paragraphs, the
first of which is applicable to transfers after June 22, 1936. The second paragraph
is applicable to transfers on or prior to that date and is the same with a few minor
differences, the most notable being that the word "terminate" is not included. How-
ever, the Supreme Court in Holmes declared that the addition of the word "termi-
nate!' was declaratory of existing law prior to 1936.
It should be noted that the power to terminate is different from the power to
revoke in that -by terminating a trust the principal and accumulated income go to
the beneficiary then entitled to the income from the trust, while by revoking, the
principal and accumulated income return to the settlor. Therefore, when a settlor
retains the power to terminate he is not reserving a power to subsequently bring
the trust back to himself; he is reserving the power to shorten the life of the trust.
2 Commissioner v. Estate of Holmes, 326 U. S. 480, 487 (1936).
'Id. at 486.
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Estate v. Commissioner5 held that such a trust would not be includible
in the decedent's estate. In that case the decedent had transferred land
to herself as trustee for the benefit of her four children and the heirs
at law of any of the children who died during the continuance of the
trust. The trustee was to pay to the beneficiaries in her discretion the
income, and the trust was to continue until the death of the settlor unless
the settlor, as trustee, terminated it prior thereto. On termination the
principal and accumulated income were to be distributed to the bene-
ficiaries, or to their heirs by the law of descent. The Commissioner of
Internal Revenue relied on the Holmes case and contended that the
decedent could change the enjoyment of the trust property by exercising
the power to terminate. The court rejected this contention, holding that,
since the beneficiaries had a vested equitable fee in the trust,0 the decedent
had no power over who should enjoy the property.7
A contrary result was reached by the Court of Claims in Lober v.
United States.8 There, the settlor created trusts providing that the
principal should be paid over to the beneficiaries on their reaching the
age of twenty-five. The settlor, as trustee, held the power to accumulate
the income until the beneficiaries became of age. The trustee could also
pay over a part or all of the principal to the beneficiaries, so that he had
in effect a power to terminate. The trust instrument made no provision
for a gift over in the event of the death of a beneficiary, but the court
decided the case on the assumption that, under New York law where the
trust was created, it would go to the beneficiaries' heirs and not back to
the settlor. The Government urged that Holmes was controlling. The
plaintiffs contended that Holmes was distinguishable. The Court of
Claims agreed with the Government's position, however, and held that
the reasoning in the Holmes case was conclusive upon it. They said:
"A father who has the power to decide that his son should have certain
assets to use, enjoy, spend, waste or invest, or to decide that he shall
Hay's Estate v. Commissioner, 181 F. 2d 169 (5th Cir. 1950).
' The court said that under the applicable state law (Mississippi) the words
"heirs" was not necessary to create an estate of inheritance, as every estate in land
is deemed a fee simple if a less estate be not clearly intended. Id., at 173.
" Cf., Estate of Barney v. Kelm, 53-2 U. S. T. C. 1 10,915, where the court in a
very similar case pointed out that if the trustees did accumulate the income and
not pay it over to the principal beneficiary, nevertheless, upon the death of the bene-
ficiary the entire trust would pass to his estate out of which the creditors would be
able to obtain satisfaction. The court said that while the trust fund would be im-
mune from the claims of creditors during the life of the beneficiary, upon his death
the limitation of the trust indenture in that regard would not apply. Consequently,
the beneficiary during his life time would enjoy the benefits of the fund and the
credit standing it would afford him even though the fund was not paid to him until
the termination of the trust or to his estate upon his death.
But see Zirjacks v. Scoffield, 197 F. 2d 688 (1952). There the Fifth Circuit held
that a similar case was covered by Section 811(d) (1). They said the law of Texas
governed this trust and it was different from Mississippi's.8 Lober v. United States, 108 F. Supp. 731 (Ct. Cl. 1952).
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not have them at all for any of these purposes, but that his creditors, his
children, wife or collateral relatives should have them, has a significant
control over assets. We think it is substantially the kind of control which
the Supreme Court was dealing with in Commissioner v. Holmes."9
Because of this conflict in the lower courts, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in the Lober case. 10 In that Court the taxpayer again
urged that Holmes was distinguishable on the grounds that there the
decedent had selected contingent beneficiaries who should take on the
death of the principal beneficiaries, while in the Lober trusts the decedent
had no control over who would take in the event of the death of a bene-
ficiary. The Court, in a brief opinion, rejected this contention, and
relying on the Holmes case, said that they were "more concerned with
'present economic benefit' than with 'technical vesting of title or estates.'
And the Lober beneficiaries were granted no 'present right to immediate
enjoyment of either income or principal.' , Thus, the Court concluded
that, if a settlor retains the power to terminate a trust, even where the
beneficiary has a vested interest, it will be includible in his gross estate
for estate tax purposes.
The question arises as to whether the whole value of the trust prop-
erty should be held subject to the estate tax. It would appear that at
most only accumulated income should be taxed. For it has been said
that:
Where by the terms of the trust a restraint on the alienation of
the right to receive the income but no restraint on the alienation
of the right to receive the principal is imposed, the creditors of
the beneficiary are entitled to a decree that the beneficiary's in-
terest in the principal should be sold.12
This would seem to give the beneficiary in a state which recognizes that
the beneficiary has the equitable fee in the trust the power to assign the
remainder interest held during the continuance of the trust. Having
the right to do this, he would have at least the present right of enjoy-
ment in the remainder. Further, if the beneficiary's interest were not
subject to spendthrift provisions, the beneficiary could assign the entire
fee during the continuance of the trust.13  Thus, it would seem that he
would have the present enjoyment of the whole fee of the trust under
such circumstances.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Helvering v. Helmholz14 should
1d. at 733.
10 Lober v. United States, 74 S. Ct. 98 (1953) ; certiorari granted in 345 U. S.
969 (1953).11Lober v. United States, 74 S. Ct. 98, 99 (1953).
21 Scot, TRUsrs § 152.5, p. 761 (1939). See also 65 C. J., Trusts § 303, p. 550
(1933).
"1I Sco-r, TRusTs § 132, p. 699 (1939).
Helvering v. Helmholz, 296 U. S. 93 (1935).
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be noted ai this point. It was held there that the retention of the power
to terminate by the decedent would not subject the trust to the estate
tax, if the trust indenture specified that the trust could be terminated
only with the consent of all the beneficiaries. Justice Roberts speaking
for the majority said: "The general rule is that all parties in interest
may terminate the trust.'5 The clause in question added nothing to the
rights which the law conferred. Congress cannot tax as a transfer in-
tended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at the death of the
settlor a trust created in a state whose law permits all the beneficiaries
to terminate the trust."'1 The Treasury Regulations are now in accord
with this holding.' 7  Thus, if Lober had not included the power to ter-
minate the trust it would not have been subjected to the estate tax, as
under the applicable state law the settlor of a trust can terminate the
trust if he obtains the consent of all parties in interest.18 And, practically
speaking, he would still have the same control, as it can be fairly assumed
that the consent of the sole beneficiary would be easily obtainable.
The Lober decision, thus, seems to be penalizing the less tax con-
scious settlor. While the fact that the consent of the beneficiaries would
be a substantial power where there are contingent beneficiaries who
would hesitate in giving away their possibility in the trust, the same
would not be true where there was only a single beneficiary who held
the whole fee in the trust property. It would therefore seem that the
Supreme Court should be concerned with "technical vesting of titles
and estates," despite what was said in the principal case.
JOHN G. HUTCHENS
Torts-Libel and Slander-Liability of Law Enforcement Officers for
Defamation Contained in Official Communications
One of the many problems arising to confront those engaged in the
enforcement of the criminal law is that of the liability of law enforcing
officers for libel and slander contained in their reports to superiors and
in their communications with other officers.
For example, an investigating officer can often put into his reports
not only statements of fact, but also much in the nature of inference,
conclusions, surmise, etc., which he is able to draw from his observations,
evaluated in the light of his own training and experience. Such things
might be characterized as "policeman's hunches." It goes without say-
" In so holding the Court cited the RESTATEMENT, TRusTs §§ 337, 338 (1935).
10 Helvering v. Helmholz, 296 U. S. 93, 97 (1935).
" U. S. TREAs. PEG. 105, § 81.20 (b) (3) (1939).
" N. Y. PEts PROP. LAW § 23; N. Y. REAL PRop. Law § 118; McEvoy v. Cen-
tral Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 274 N. Y. 27, 8 N. E. 2d 265 (1937).
See also N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 39-6, 39-6.1 (1950) for the comparable North
Carolina law on this point. It is provided there that the grantor in a voluntary
conveyance may revoke the interest of any person not in esse.
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ing that such material is extremely valuable to other officers, to those
guiding the over-all investigation, and to prosecutors.
A fear of civil liability for defamatory statements of this type has led
to policies in many law enforcement agencies of allowing only statements
of fact to be included in investigative and arrest reports, while matters
of opinion are transmitted orally, or in some instances by inter-agency
memoranda, access to which is closely restricted. The disadvantages
of these methods (particularly the former) from the standpoint of effi-
ciency can readily be seen. In view of the increasing volume and sig-
nificance of this work, it seems important that some clarification of the
situation be attempted, with the view that the service of these agencies
to the public should not be unnecessarily restricted, and that these offi-
cers should know the extent of their protection from civil liability while
engaged in the discharge of their duties.
The law of libel and slander recognizes that statements which would
otherwise be defamatory may be made on certain occasions where the
defamer should be allowed to speak his mind freely in the furtherance
of some important public interest, and it makes the existence of these
occasions defenses to suits for libel and slander. Thus defamatory state-
ments published on such privileged occasions are called "privileged com-
munications."1  They are of two types: "absolute," and "qualified" or
"conditional."
In cases of absolute privilege, immunity is granted the defamer re-
gardless of the falsity of the communication, his knowledge of that falsity,
or the motives which prompt him to make it. Originally, this privilege
was narrowly restricted to legislative and judicial proceedings and to
reports of military officers to superiors. In more recent years, however,
the courts have extended it to executive officers of the government. The
case of Spalding v. Vilas,2 where absolute immunity was granted a
federal cabinet officer, may be considered as representing the first step
in this direction.3  The privilege has subsequently been extended not
only to heads of executive departments of the government, but also to
inferior officers of such departments when engaged in the discharge of
their duties. 4
I It is helpful to recognize that it is the occasion which is privileged. The com-
munication made on a privileged occasion may not, for reasons discussed below,
always be privileged.
2 161 U. S. 483 (1896) ; Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, 196, 88 A. 2d 892,
896 (1952).
Glass v. Ickes, 117 F. 2d 273, 132 A. L. R. 1328 (D. C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied,
311 U. S. 718 (1940) (Secretary of the Interior).
'Farr v. Valentine, 38 App. D. C. 413, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 821 (1912) (Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs of the Department of the Interior) ; DeArnaud v. Ains-
worth, 24 App. D. C. 167, 5 L. R. A. (NS) 163 (1904), writ of error dismissed,
199 U. S. 616 (1905) (chief of the Record and Pension" Office of the War De-
partment).
1954]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The federal courts seem to be more liberal than most state courts
in extending this absolute privilege. 5 Where the communication was
made to a superior officer, the privilege has been granted by federal
courts to a consul,0 a naval officer 1 and an internal revenue agent.8
Some state courts have also extended the unqualified privilege rather
far.9 Two cases in which such a privilege was granted to communica-
tions passing between law enforcement officers engaged in investigating
a crime are Stivers v. Allen,'° and Catron v. Jasper." ' Unfortunately,
some state courts have carried the privilege to unwarranted extremes. 12
The recent case of Matson v. Margiotti'8 is an example of the abuses
Note, 33 ILL. L. REY. 358 (1938).
1United States to Use of Parravicino v. Brunswick, 69 F. 2d 383 (D. C. Cir.1934).
Miles v. McGrath, 4 F. Supp. 603 (D. Md. 1933), Note, 12 N. C. L. Rsv. 170
(1934).
'Harwood v. McMurtry, 22 F. Supp. 572 (W. D. Ky. 1938). Considerations
against affording protection to officers for false and malicious statements are out-
weighed by an "imperative public policy that perfect freedom in the discharge of
public duties is essential to the maintenance of efficient public service and must be
preserved without restraint." Id. at 573.
' E.g., Powers v. Vaughn, 312 Mich. 297, 20 N. W. 2d 196 (1945) (officials of
health department).
'0 115 Wash. 136, 196 Pac. 663 (1921).
11303 Ky. 598, 198 S. W. 2d 322 (1946). The court regarded an absolute
privilege as "essential for the enforcement of the . . . law...." Id. at 604, 198
S. W. 2d at 325.
" In Donner v. Francis, 255 Ill. App. 409 (1930), one defendant was the officer
in charge of a U. S. Veterans' Hospital; the other was plaintiff's immediate su-
perior. The court said: "All communications, either verbal or written, passing
between public officials pertaining to their duties and in the conduct of public busi-
ness are of necessity absolutely privileged and such matters cannot be made the
basis of recovery in a suit at law." (emphasis added) Id. at 413. In Haskell V.
Perkins, 165 I1. App. 144 (1911), defendant, plaintiff's superior, filed charges
against plaintiff with a board of education, their employer. However, each of the
foregoing decisions might be explained by remarks of the courts that the proceed-
ings therein were in the nature of quasi-judicial proceedings. Absolute immunity
was granted to private citizens who petitioned the Board of County Commissioners
for revocation of plaintiff's liquor license in Lininger v. Knight, 123 Colo. 213, 226
P. 2d 809 (1951).Proceedings and communications of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial agencies
are sometimes granted absolute privilege, as extensions of that given to legislative
and judicial proceedings. McAlister & Co. v. Jenkins, 214 Ky. 802, 284 S. W. 88
(1926) (real estate commission) ; Stafney v. Standard Oil Co., 71 N. D. 170, 299
N. W. 582, 136 A. L. R. 535 (1941) (Workmens' Compensation Bureau); Bigelow
v. Brumley, 138 Ohio St. 574, 37 N. E. 2d 584 (1941) (commission appointed by
legislature to prepare and circulate official arguments on proposed constitutional
amendment).
19371 Pa. 188, 88 A. 2d 892 (1952). There a letter was sent, having been
released to the press prior to its sending, by a state attorney general to a district
attorney concerning alleged communistic activities of a member of the latter's staff
and demanding her dismissal. In a three-to-two decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held both the letter and its release to the press absolutely privileged. De-
fendant did not plead truth, admitting that plaintiff had been cleared of such
charges by a county bar association. The dissenting judges also pointed out that
there was no official duty requiring defendant to make such publications. Id. at
212, 88 A. 2d at 902. This decision has been widely criticized by legal writers.
See, e.g., Note, 37 MINN. L. Ray. 141 (1953).
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possible when unqualified immunity is granted, even to high executive
officers.
Absolute privilege, on the one hand, is given to those whose positions
or duties are such that they should be completely free to act as they
choose, without even the harassment of having to defend against litiga-
tions by proving their good intentions. Necessarily, this means that
they must be protected from litigation even if their motives are bad.
On the other hand, there is the consideration of the right of citizens to
be free from unredressable injuries to their reputations, a right which
it is the fundamental aim and purpose of the law of libel and slander to
protect. Thus the question is one of balance between two conflicting
public interests. It would seem that absolute immunity from liability
for defamatory publications should be as narrowly restricted as pos-
sible.14
In the nature of a compromise between the two extremes is the doc-
trine of "qualified" or "conditional" privilege, where the interest pro-
tected is deemed not to be of such importance that the immunity is abso-
lute, but it is of sufficient importance that immunity is given, conditioned
upon proper purpose and good faith. Conditional immunity is granted
in a much wider variety or situations than is absolute immunity-
summed up by Baron Parke as those communications "fairly made by
a person in the discharge of some public or private duty, whether legal
or moral, or in the conduct of his own affairs, in matters where his in-
terest is concerned."
15
Communications on any matters in which the public has an interest
are conditionally privileged. Thus public officers, whose 'duties are un-
doubtedly affected with a public interest, should be protected by at least
a qualified privilege in the discharge of their duties. And it is generally
so held. 16 More specifically, the prevention of crime being a matter of
"'Tanner v. Stevenson, 138 Ky. 578, 128 S. W. 878, 30 L. R. A. (NS) 200
(1910) ; Comment, Defamation Immunity for Executive Oflcers, 20 U. OF CnI. L.
Rav. 677, 679 (1953) : "The privilege should be confined to those officials whose
functions are so necessary that individual rights must be subordinated. Society
and the individuals who compose it should not be forced to surrender their rights
in return for relatively unimportant services. For offices of less than paramount
importance a conditional privilege, sustainable in the great majority of cases, is
fully adequate."
" Toogood v. Spyring, 1 Cr. M. & R. 181, 193, 149 Eng. Rep. 1044, 1049 (Ex.
1834). "A communication made bona fide upon any subject matter in which the
party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty. ... "
Lord Campbell C J., in Harrison v. Bush, 5 El. & B1. 344, 348, 119 Eng. Rep. 509,
512 (K. B. 1895).
The situations covered by the qualified privilege may be categorized roughly as
those involving (1) protection of the publisher's interest; (2) protection of an
interest of the recipient or a third person; (3) protection of a common interest;
(4) protection of a public interest. PRoSSER, TORTS § 94 (1941) ; RESTATEmEXT,
TORTS §§ 594-598 (1938).
"
0Tanner v. Stevenson, 138 Ky. 578, 128 S. W. 878, 30 L. R. A. (NS) 200(1910) (school superintendent); Ranson v. West, 125 Ky. 457, 101 S. W. 885
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public interest, communications otherwise slanderous are protected if
"they are made in good faith in the prosecution of an inquiry regarding
a crime which has been committed and for the purpose of detecting-and
bringing to punishment the criminal. 117  As the conditional privilege is
granted to private citizens on this basis,' 8 it should surely extend to
public agencies'9 and to law enforcing officers.2 0
In accordance with the accepted rules of qualified privilege, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina has granted such privilege to de-
famatory communications, made by private citizens to the proper authori-
ties, charging crime,21 or charging misconduct of public officials2 2 and
also to such statements made by private citizens to other interested per-
sons during the course of investigations into crimes.23  There is no
indication that the North Carolina Court would extend an absolute
privilege to law enforcement and other minor public officers for com-
munications made in the discharge of their duties.2 4
In cases in which the conditional privilege is granted, the defendant,
in order to be protected from liability for his defamation, must not abuse
the privilege. That is to say, there are certain conditions which must
be satisfied in order to claim this qualified immunity. They can be
divided into three somewhat overlapping categories:
(1) there must be no express malice;
(2) there must be a belief of the truth of the communication; and
(1907) ("common school trustees") ; Maurice v. Worden, 54 Md. 233, 39 Am. Rep.
384 (1880) (superintendent of U. S. Naval Academy) ; Peterson v. Steenerson, 113
Minn. 87, 129 N. W. 147, 31 L. R. A. (NS) 674 (1910) (postmaster); Stevenson
v. Ward, 48 App. Div. 291, 62 N. Y. S. 717 (4th Dep't 1900) (superintendent of
municipal water department).
"' Eames v. Whittaker, 123 Mass. 342, 344 (1877).
"' White v. Nicholls, 3 How. 266 (U. S. 1844) ; Pecue v. West, 233 N. Y. 316,
135 N. E. 515 (1922) ; accord, Stewart v. Major, 17 Wash. 238, 49 Pac. 503 (1897).
The desirability of giving absolute immunity to F. B. I. informers was raised in
Foltz v. Moore McCormack Lines, Inc., 189 F. 2d 537 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U. S. 871 (1951). The Court of Appeals, in reversing the district court's
order dismissing the complaint, decided that a qualified immunity was adequate.
" Peeples v. State, 179 Misc. 272, 38 N. Y. S. 2d 690 (Ct. Claims 1942) (audi-
tors) ; In re Investigating Commission, 16 R. I. 751, 11 Ati. 429 (1887) ; Hollis v.
McCammon, Morris & Pickens, 86 S. W. 2d 652 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) (auditors).
"' Morton v. Knipe, 128 App. Div. 94, 112 N. Y. S. 451 (2d Dep't 1908) ; City
of Mullens v. Davidson, 133 W. Va. 557, 57 S. E. 2d 1, 13 A. L. R. 2d 887 (1949)
cf., Illinois Cent. R. R. v. Wales, 177 Miss. 875, 171 So. 536 (1937).
" Hartsfield v. Harvey C. Hines Co., 200 N. C. 356, 157 S. E. 16 (1931);
Briggs v. Byrd, 34 N. C. 377 (1851).2 Alexander v. Vann, 180 N. C. 187, 104 S. E. 360 (1920) ; Logan v. Hodges,
146 N. C. 38, 59 S. E. 349 (1907).
" Hartsfield v. Harvey C. Hines Co., 200 N. C. 356, 157 S. E. 16 (1931) ; Hearn
v. Ostrander, 194 N. C. 753, 140 S. E. 724 (1927); Elmore v. Atlantic Coast Line
R. R., 189 N. C. 658, 127 S. E. 710 (1925).
"' But see a dictum in Lewis v. Carr, 178 N. C. 578, 580, 101 S. E. 97, 98
(1919) : "The publication was not absolutely privileged, for it was not in the per-
formance of public service, in which case, notwithstanding proof of the falsity of
the charge and actual malice, an action cannot be maintained thereon." (emphasis
added)
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(3) the privilege must not be "exceeded."
First, defendant will lose his qualified privilege if he makes the pub-
lication in the wrong state of mind-i.e., if there is "express malice."
The word "malice" has two distinct meanings in the law of -defamation:
(a) "malice implied in law," a presumption of malice which arises in
order to satisfy the technical requirements of the law whenever a de-
famatory communication is made on an occasion not privileged; and (b)
"express malice," or "malice in fact." When the occasion is qualifiedly
privileged, it is necessary for plaintiff to prove actual malice in order
to recover. It should be noted that the presence of express malice does
not destroy the legal justification or excuse which makes the occasion
privileged, but it means that defendant has forfeited the defense given
to him by the occasion because he used it for a wrongful purpose.25
There is some confusion in terminology as to exactly what consti-
tutes express malice. It is said that defendant must be actuated by spite
or ill will, "with a design to causelessly or wantonly injure the plain-
tiff."2 Other courts stress the necessity for good faith.2 7 Mere negli-
gence in making defamatory statements is generally not enough for a
showing of actual malice,28 but wantonness or recklessness may be.2 9
Nor is proof of the falsity of the communication, unless defendant knew
of it at the time, sufficient evidence to establish malice.30 Actual malice
can best be epitomized as a wrong or unjustifiable motive.3 '
The American Law Institute, in its Restatement of Torts, discards
the concept of "malice" as unsatisfactory and substitutes the requirement
that 'defendant must "act for the purpose of protecting the particular in-
terest for the protection of which the privilege is given."
3 2
"'Note, 10 NEB. L. BULL. 193 (1931).211 NEWELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL § 277, p. 315 (4th ed. 1924) ; Elmore v. Atlantic
Coast Line R. R., 189 N. C. 658, 127 S. E. 710 (1925) ; Bell v. Bank of Abbeville,
208 S. C. 490, 38 S. E. 2d 641 (1946).
"' Friedell v. Blakely Printing Co., 163 Minn. 226, 203 N. W. 974 (1925);
Lawless v. Muller, 99 N. J. L. 9, 12, 123 Atl. 104, 105 (1923) ("The fundamental
test is the bona fides of the communication.").
.8 Pecue v. West, 233 N. Y. 316, 135 N. E. 515 (1922) ; Peeples v. State, 179
Misc. 272, 38 N. Y. S. 2d 690 (Ct. Claims 1942).
- Elms v. Crane, 118 Me. 261, 107 Atl. 852 (1919).
"Lewis v. Carr, 178 N. C. 578, 101 S. E. 97 (1919) ; Ramsey v. Cheek, 109
N. C. 270, 13 S. E. 775 (1891).
"' Stevenson v. Northington, 204 N. C. 690, 169 S. E. 622 (1933); Riley v.
Stone, 174 N. C. 588, 94 S. E. 434 (1917) ; Krug v. Pitass, 162 N. Y. 154, 56 N. E.
526, 76 Am. St. Rep. 317 (1900); Hallen, Character of Belief Necessary for the
Conditional Privilege in Defamation, 25 ILL. L. REv. 865, 865-6 (1931).
The malice does not have to be against plaintiff personally, but can be indirect.
Stevenson v. Northington, supra; Gattis v. Kilgo, 128 N. C. 402, 38 S. E. 931(1901).
"RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 603 (1938). Under this test, the existence of ill will
would not be an abuse of the privileged occasion as long as defendant acted to pro-
tect or further the privileged interest; conversely, if he did not act to protect that
interest, the privilege could be abused even though there was no ill will or spite.
See Elms v. Crane, 118 Me. 261, 107 AtI. 852 (1919), illustrating this proposition.
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At any rate, it is generally held that the burden of proving actual
malice is on the plaintiff,33 that it is a question for the jury,3 4 and that
it may be determined from all the circumstances surrounding the com-
munication.35
The second condition necessary in order for defendant to claim the
protection of the privileged occasion is that he believe his communication
to be true. Some courts hold that the test is whether defendant honestly
believed his statement to be true.3 6 Other courts, however, apply a
negligence standard--i.e., that defendant must have had reasonable
grounds or probable cause for believing his communication true.37
The third general requirement is that there not be what may be called
an "excess of privilege. s38 Such an excess might be found, for example,
if the communication were not within the scope of defendant's official
duties,30 if the statements were irrelevant,40 if undue publicity were
"Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Yount, 69 F. 2d 700 (8th Cir. 1933);
Parker v. Edwards, 222 N. C. 75, 21 S. E. 2d 876 (1942) ; Riley v. Stone, 174 N. C.
588, 94 S. E. 434 (1917).
" Riley v. Stone, 174 N. C. 588, 94 S. E. 434 (1917).
" "Malice may be proved by extrinsic evidence of personal ill feeling, or by
intrinsic evidence such as the exaggerated language of the libel, the character of
the language used . . . , the mode and extent of publication, and other matters in
excess of the privilege." Friedell v. Blakely Printing Co., 163 Minn. 226, 231, 203
N. W. 974, 976 (1925) ; Bell v. Bank of Abbeville, 208 S. C. 490, 38 S. E. 2d 641
(1946).
" Barry v. McCollom, 81 Conn. 293, 70 Ati. 1035 (1908) ; Harrison v. Garrett,
132 N. C. 172, 43 S. E. 594 (1903) ; Joseph v. Baars, 142 Wis. 390, 125 N. W. 913
(1910) ; Clark v. Molyneux [1877] 3 Q. B. D. 237, 47 L. 3. Q. B. 230, 14 Cox.,
C. C. 10.
However, it is doubtful if even an honest belief will protect statements made
recklessly. Joseph v. Baars, supra.
"Lafferty v. Houlihan, 81 N. H. 67, 121 Atl. 92 (1923) ; cf., Elms v. Crane,
118 Me. 261, 107 Atl. 852 (1919); Hollis v. McCammon, Morris & Pickens, 86
S. W. 2d 652 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) ("evidence rendering probable that the auditor
was sincere in the report").
The courts often add such requirements, possibly without intending to mean
anything more than a bona fide belief of truth. Pecue v. West, 233 N. Y. 316, 322,
135 N. E. 515, 517 (1922) ; Lewis v. Carr, 178 N. C. 578, 580, 101 S. E. 97, 98
(1919) ; Ramsey v. Cheek, 109 N. C. 270, 274, 13 S. E. 775, 776 (1891).
Defendant can rely on hearsay and rumor if he communicates them as such and
"for what they are worth." Pecue v. West, 233 N. Y. 316, 323, 135 N. E. 515, 517
(1922).
"0 This expression is sometimes used to mean the existence of express malice.
As the term is used here, however, it means those things which take the communi-
cation outside the privilege as a matter of law. "Whether defendant abused or
exceeded the privilege of the occasion is ... a question of law to be determined
by the court." Swearingen v. Parkersburg Sentinel Co., 125 W. Va. 731, 743, 26
S. E. 2d 209, 215 (1943) ; Gattis v. Kilgo, 140 N. C. 106, 52 S. E. 249 (1905).
These same factors, on the other hand, might also be considered by the jury as
evidence of express malice. See note 35 supra.
"Hale Co. v. Lea, 191 Cal. 202, 215 Pac. 900 (1923) ; Stanley v. Prince, 118
Me. 360, 108 Atl. 328 (1919) ; Jacobs v. Herlands, 17 N. Y. S. 2d 711 (Sup. Ct.
1940), aff'd, 259 App. Div. 823, 19 N. Y. S. 2d 770 (2d Dep't 1940) ; cf., Elmore
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 189 N. C. 658, 127 S. E. 710 (1925).
,0 Bohlinger v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 100 Ark. 477, 140 S. W. 257 (1911);
Andrews v. Gardiner, 224 N. Y. 440, 121 N. E. 341 (1918) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS
§605 (1938).
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given to the communication, 4 1 or if improper or abusive language were
used.42
Some conclusions may be drawn from the foregoing: (1) It is very
doubtful that the North Carolina Court and most other courts would
extend the absolute privilege to ordinary law enforcement and investiga-
tive officers. Such a privilege probably should not be extended. (2) It
may be stated with certainty that a qualified privilege is available to
such officers in the bona fide discharge of their duties (since it is avail-
able to private citizens under similar circumstances), and that adequate
protection will be afforded them by the qualified privilege. (3) As long
as the defamatory communication is not made from some feeling of per-
sonal ill will, and is made as a reasonable man would make it under the
circumstances-that is, with a reasonable belief of its truth, without
abusive language, and without undue publicity-there is little doubt but
that the officer will be immune from liability for that communication.
JosEPH G. DAIL, JR.
'x Colpoys v. Gates, 118 F. 2d 16 (D. C. Cir. 1940) ; Fields v. Bynum, 156 N. C.
413, 72 S. E. 449 (1911).
12 Ordinarily, violent language used in the communication would be evidence of
express malice for the jury. See note 35 supra. The only question for the court
to decide is whether there is sufficient evidence of malice to go to the jury. The
North Carolina Supreme Court's standard here is "not to give the language of
privileged communications too strict a scrutiny. 'To hold all excess beyond the
absolute exigency of the occasion to be evidence of malice, would, in effect, greatly
limit, if not altogether defeat, that protection which the law throws over privileged
communications.'" Gattis v. Kilgo, 128 N. C. 402, 412, 38 S. E. 931, 935 (1901).
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THE NORTH CAROLINA BAR ASSOCIATION
This year for the first time in its long and illustrious history the
North Carolina Bar Association launched a full-scale program of public
relations activities designed to emphasize the value of preventive law to
the people of North Carolina. While much lies ahead to be accomplished
in this field, the achievements this year under the leadership of President
William L. Thorp and committees of the Association afford a solid
foundation for effective expansion of this program.
Last November the first step in the enlarged program was taken by
the employment of a full-time Executive Secretary. He is Charles W.
Daniel, native of Wake County, a former newsman, an A.B. graduate
of Carolina and a recent law* graduate of Wake Forest. The Association
established new headquarters in the Capital Club Building in Raleigh.
During the winter months the Association sponsored a state-wide
series of weekly radio broadcasts over thirty-one radio stations. The
programs, panel-style, were on broad, general legal topics and were well
received. It is expected that a new round of radio programs will begin
next Fall.
In April the Association inaugurated a series of news columns on
general legal subjects in the weekly and daily press on the state. Dr.
Robert E. Lee, of the Wake Forest Law Faculty, is author of the articles
appearing in the daily papers. Secretary Daniel and Attorneys William
Joslin, Thomas F. Adams, Jr. and Ferd L. Davis collaborate in provid-
ing articles for the weekly press.
Under the able and effective leadership of J. Spencer Bell, head of
the Association's Continuing Legal Education Committee, two excellent
institutes have been held to date this year, both at Chapel Hill. The first,
in January, dealt with the subject of Small Business Loans and Financ-
ing. The second, in March, dealt with three subjects: Estates and Trusts,
Federal Rules of Discovery, and Workmen's Compensation. A Tax
Institute is being planned by Chairman Leon Rice and his committee to
be held during the summer. All continuing legal education activities
are conducted by the Association in cooperation with the law schools of
Carolina, Duke and Wake Forest.
The Association is cooperating fully with the North Carolina State
Bar Incorporated in order to advance the administration of justice and
eliminate unauthorized practice of law.
During the year the Association introduced a pocket-sized periodical
designated "Bar Notes," containing articles, notes and items of interest
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to the Bar generally. The first two issues appeared in January and
May, 1954, and were edited by Secretary Daniel.
Other features of the Association's activities include: a legal aid
program under the direction of the Association's Legal Aid Committee,
headed by Dr. John S. Bradway, of Duke University, in cooperation
with the state and county welfare departments; and the work of the
Association's Committee on Legislation and Law Reform with respect
to legislation to be reported to the Association for recommendation to
the General Assembly.
Officers of the Association for the current year are: William L.
Thorp, president; Chief Justice M. V. Barnhill, Carroll W. Weathers,
and John Manning, vice-presidents; Edward L. Cannon, secretary;
Robert H. Frazier, chairman, James K. Dorsett, Jr., Sam B. Underwood,
Jr., Joel B. Adams, J. B. Swails, A. W. Kennon, Jr., executive commit-
tee, with Messrs. Thorp, Bell and Cannon, ex officio members of the
committee.
CARROLL W. WEATHERS
Vice-President

